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JURISDICTION 
The defendant's Notice of Appeal was received in the Utah Supreme Court on 
October 17, 1995, pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(l)(j) (1953, as amended). On February 9, 1996, the 
Supreme Court transferred this case to the Court of Appeals for disposition pursuant to 
Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(k). 
On January 3, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court entered its "Order Permitting 
Appellees to Supplement Record on Appeal." A copy of this Order is in the plaintiffs 
Addendum.1 Hereafter the Appellees will cite the Court to the primary record in Judge 
Frank G, Noel's Court as ttR _w and the Supplemental Record from Judge Timothy R. 
Hanson's Court as "S0R. _." 
This appeal arises from a summary judgment entered by Judge Frank G. Noel of the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on September 8, 
1995, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in Civil No. 930902492CN. 
The underlying case in Judge Hanson's Court is Civil No. 900907125. 
Paragraph 1 of the Order provides "1. The appellees are hereby permitted to supplement the record on 
appeal to include the official file and record in the lawsuit in Judge Timothy R. Hanson's Court as Civil No. 
900907125 PI entitled MYRA L» TAYLOR Plaintiff v. RONALD EL OLSON, CAROL D. OLSON, and 
JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON. Defendants Paragraph 3 of this Order provides "3. Both parties may use 
the supplemental record on appeal in any Briefs, Addenda, or other documents which are filed in this 
Supreme Court* On January 22, 19%, the Clerk of the Supreme Court entered his Notice wc . .the 
supplemental record index on appeal has been filed" This Supplemental Record includes the official file in 
Judge Timothy Rc Hanson's Court as well as some ten (10) separate depositions, all of which were published 
by Judge Hansoa It also includes two (2) court reporter's transcripts and some sixteen (16) exhibits 
introduced and admitted at trial With the exception of the Trial Exhibits, all the other documents from Judge 
Hanson's case have been paginated and included in the Supplemental Index which the District Court Clerk 
sent to the Supreme Court 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiffs agree generally with the Defendant's "Statement of the Case" 
("Defendant's Statement") as far as it goes, however the Defendant has failed to include 
several pertinent matters which are necessary in order to make its Statement a complete and 
full disclosure,2 
Defendant completely omits from its Statement of the Case any reference to the 
extensive correspondence between the Olsons' counsel, Michael N. Martinez, in the 
underlying Taylor v. Olsons lawsuit, and the insurance company adjusters and their legal 
counsel. These numerous letters are included in Exhibit "T attached to the Complaint in 
the instant case, said Exhibit 7 being also found at R. 90 - 123. These letters clearly 
demonstrate that starting just a few months after the accident in 1987, and continuing 
through the trial on November 19, 1992, the Olsons, through their counsel, Gary Howe, 
Esq., and Michael N. Martinez, Esq., were requesting the Defendant repeatedly to 
undertake the defense in the lawsuit filed by Myra L. Taylor against the Olsons. These 
2For example, the Defendant's Statement sets out the three exclusions in "SECTION II - EXCLUSIONS" 
on page 11 of 15 of the homeowner's insurance policy. However, the Defendant neglected to say anything 
about COVERAGE E - Personal Liability in SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGES, which provides if a 
claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property 
damaged caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies, American Fire would (1) pay up to its limit 
of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable; and (2) provide a defense at its expense by 
counsel of its choice, even if the suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent. This provision is discussed more fully 
in COUNT 6 of this Brief, infra. 
The defendant further fails to disclose this appeal involves a defense based solely on the three (3) 
exclusions found in the homeowner's policy on page 11 of 15 SECTION II - EXCLUSIONS at subparagraphs 
l.e.(l), (2), and (3). This appeal does not involve any other policy defenses such as (1) failure by the insured 
to cooperate with the insurer, (2) collusion, (3) intentional torts or willful misconduct, (4) failure to timely 
notify the insurer, lack of privity between the Plaintiffs and the insurer, unreasonableness of attorney fees 
awarded, unreasonableness of the interest awarded in the judgment, etc None of these "defenses" were made 
part of the record in the trial court, none of them were discussed by Defendant's counsel in the Memoranda 
she filed, and none of them are referred to even remotely in any part of the "Brief of Appellant." 
-2-
letters also contain an acknowledgement by American Fire it may be liable under certain 
circumstances which later were found to exist by Judge Timothy R. Hanson in the 
underlying lawsuit3 
On page 4 of its Brief, the Defendant refers to certain Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which were entered by Judge Hanson following the bench trial of 
November 19, 1992. The significant facts which Defendant omits to include are that at the 
final pretrial conference on September 29, 1992, in the underlying lawsuit, Judge Hanson 
spent over an hour with counsel formalizing procedures to be used at the time of the trial. 
Also, counsel for the Plaintiffs advised the Court as to the nature of the claimed injuries 
of the Plaintiff and advised the Court as to the anticipated evidence relating to special and 
general damages. The parties acknowledged there was little dispute with regard to the facts 
3In this connection see the letter in Exhibit "7" dated July 22,1992, from HL R Carlson, Claims Supervisor 
for American Fire to Michael N. Martinez, Esq., attorney for the Olsons at R. 100 and which letter is also 
included in the Plaintiffs' Addendum. This letter pertains to Mr. Carlson's review of the deposition of Jennifer 
Heather Olson. Mr. Carlson comments. 
We do not believe the deposition demonstrates a lack of parental supervision by 
Ronald Olson and Carol Olson, as alleged. We believe that such an allegation of necessity 
would have to be supported by direct statements made by Ronald Olson and Carol Olson 
pertaining to their knowledge of Jennifer's use of the vehicle and knowledge of her habits of 
consumption of alcohol. Should you wish to make available to us copies of the deposition 
of Ronald Olson and Carol Olson, we shall further consider the case... 
It is abundantly clear American Fire recognized that if there was any evidence to support the 
allegations in Count 5 of Myra L. Taylor's underlying Complaint about Jennifer Heather Olson's use of the 
Volkswagen automobile and her habits for the consumption of alcohol, and if the parents knew of these facts, 
there would be liability under the policy. Unfortunately, American Fire made no effort to appear at any 
hearings including the final pretrial conference where all the evidence concerning these matters was presented. 
American Fire also did not attend the trial of this matter where the evidence pertaining to its concerns in the 
July 22, 1992 letter were also admitted into evidence. 
After hearing all the evidence, including the testimony from all three Olsons, and taking the case 
under advisement for some two months, the Trial Judge Timothy Rc Hanson made numerous Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law pertaining to the fact the Parents/Olsons knew all about Heather's drinking habits 
and also her use of the vehicle prior to the time of the accident In this connection, see Judge Hanson's 
findings at paragraphs 23,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39, and 40, bearing on Mr. Carlson's specific 
concerns in his July 22nd letter. These Findings of Fact are found at S.R. 210-224 and are included in 
Plaintiffs Addendum. 
-3-
"including the conduct of Defendant Jennifer Heather Olson prior to and at the time of the 
accident in question.11 The parties also agreed all depositions could be published and the 
Court entered its Order to publish the depositions. The final Pretrial Order is found at S.R. 
162-164 and is included in Plaintiffs Addendum.4 
In its statement, the Defendant refers to the "Stipulation" which is found at S.R. 177-
184. Again, Michael N. Martinez told the Defendant all about the anticipated Stipulation 
and the reasons why it was being entered into. In this connection, see the letters from Mr. 
Martinez to George R. Kesl, Defendant's Claims Manager at R. 99 and the further letters 
from Mr. Martinez to Defendant's counsel Donald J. Purser, Esq. at R. 103, 104, and 106. 
Finally, on page 4 of its Brief, the Defendant refers to certain Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which were prepared by Myra L. Taylor's counsel, James A. Mcintosh, 
and submitted to Judge Hanson. The significant part of the record which the Defendant 
omits to disclose is Judge Hanson took over two (2) months to review the said Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, then made several changes on same and requested Plaintiffs' 
counsel to incorporate the pencilled changes and submit new documents which Judge 
Hanson then immediately signed.5 
4As stated in the comments pertaining to "jurisdiction," on page 1 of this Brief, supra, the official record 
in Judge Frank G. Noel's Court is being referred to in this Brief as R. and the supplemental record 
from the underlying case in Timothy R. Hanson's Court is being referred to as S.R. . All of the 
rulings by the Judge at this final pretrial were transmitted by Michael N. Martinez, attorney for the Olsons, 
to the Defendant and its counsel. See R* 103-105. S.R. 175 is the "Minute Entry" showing the ten (10) 
original depositions were published at the time of the trial, and the Defendants Ronald Olson, Carol Olson, 
and Jennifer Heather Olson were sworn add examined. Again, if American Fire had been represented either 
at final pretrial or at the trial itself, it would have known its liability under the homeowner's insurance policy 
was firmly and fully established and Mr. Carlson's concerns in his July 22,1992 letter, supra, would have been 
fully satisfied by the evidence submitted. 
nl ie Court Reporter's transcript of Judge Hanson's comments at trial discloses his thinking with respect 
to the parties' Stipulation and the Plaintiffs' proposed Findings of Fact and how the Judge was going to 
carefully review these documents as well as the Exhibits and Depositions before signing any Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, or Final Judgment. See S.R. 234-243. Judge Hanson also described in detail his 
methodology for arriving at the general damages he might award. See S.R. 237-238. He said he would make 
-4-
The Court's pencilled changes in the Plaintiffs' proposed Findings, Conclusions, and 
Judgment are found at S.R. 192-209. The Court's final Findings, Conclusions, and 
Judgment which were entered on January 27, 1993, are found at S.R. 210-227. Both the 
Plaintiffs' proposed Findings, etc. and the Court's final Findings, etc. are included in the 
Plaintiffs' Addendum. 
changes in any of Plaintiffs' proposed Findings of Fact he felt needed to be changed and would send these 
documents with his pencilled changes to Plaintiffs' counsel to prepare a new draft A copy of the Court 
Reporter's Transcript is included in the Plaintiffs' AddendunL 
On January 25,1993, he sent a letter to James A, Mcintosh, Esq. and to Michael N. Martinez, Esq. 
dealing with his detailed examination of the exhibits and the other evidence that was submitted at trial This 
letter is found in S.R. 190-191, and is included in Plaintiffs' Addendum. In this letter, Judge Hanson states 
in part as follows: 
I am satisfied that the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
appropriate in relation to the issue of special damages, such as lost wages, essential services, 
and medical expenses, and I am willing to adopt those provisions of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as the Court's. As to general damages, I believe the evidence supports 
a general damage verdict in the amount of one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars 
($125,000) and have made the appropriate pencil changes on the original Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Final Judgment... 
The Court also noted other pencilled changes it had made on the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and then directed Plaintiffs' counsel to prepare new Findings of Fact incorporating the 
Judge's changes: 
I include the original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the original Final 
Judgment in Mr. Mcintosh's copy of this letter to counsel. Please make the appropriate 
changes in accordance with the pencilled changes noted above and found on the original 
documents themselves, and resubmit them, at which time the Court would be in a position 
to sign the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Judgment immediately. 
All other Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Final Judgment appear to 
be appropriate in form, and are adopted as presented as the Court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Final Judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Plaintiffs agree generally with the Defendant's "Statement of the Facts," however 
the Defendant has omitted to make a full disclosure to this Court of many material facts 
which bear on the issues which this Court is being asked to decide*6 
In addition to the following record references, the Parents/Olsons, as well as their 
minor child Heather, testified at trial In this regard see trial Minute Entry at S.R. 175 
showing their trial testimony and the Court Reporter's Transcript of their testimony at S.R. 
246-248/ 
1. On page 7 of its Statement of Facts, the Defendant says the 1974 Volkswagen Bug automobile 
owned by Heather's father, Ronald H. Olson, "was not insured or registered, and did not have license plates. 
(R. 671, 761)" Also, on page 8 the Defendant correctly admits that Heather "removed license plates from a 
shelf in her parent's garage, affixed them to the Volkswagen with a screwdriver, and then drove the vehicle 
to the aforementionedparty on the evening of October 16,1987. (R. 660-661)" The omitted facts are that not 
only was the Volkswagen Bug not insured, not licensed, and not registered, it was also "not meant to be 
driven" because it was "an old car that was going to be restored and was not to be driven, but was to remain 
stored on the Olson's property." See Olsons' Consolidated Answers to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories, 
Answers Nos. 20 and 21 at S.R. 86. The Olsons also acknowledged in their Consolidated Answer to 
Interrogatory No. 23(d) that the Volkswagen was not "road worthy, registered or insured," and that they had 
told Heather not to use the Volkswagen, but rather to use their Buick automobile. See S.R. 87. Furthermore, 
even though the Volkswagen had been purchased in April 1987, some six (6) months before the accident, it 
had never been registered, insured, or licensed during all that time. See Olsons* Consolidated Answer to 
Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 55 at S.R. 99-100. 
2. On page 8 of its Brief, the Defendant rightly acknowledges Heather did not have the parents' 
permission to drive the Volkswagen to the party and had, in fact, been instructed by her parents not to drive 
the vehicle. (R. 652-656, 661) The significant facts which the Defendant omits to disclose to this Court deal 
with the § 316 Restatement of Torts (Second) cause of action making the Parents/Olsons liable for their 
negligence in failing to supervise and control the conduct of their sixteen (16)-year-old minor child Jennifer 
Heather Olson ("Heather"). The omitted facts demonstrate Heather's drinking habits since the eighth grade, 
her repeated and illegal use of the 1974 Volkswagen Bug which she was driving on the night of the accident, 
but which was not registered, not licensed, not insured, not roadworthy, and was not meant to be driven on 
the public highways. These facts also demonstrate the Parents/Olsons had prior knowledge of all of Heather's 
illegal activities. 
All three Olsons testified at trial that they had reviewed the Stipulation which all the parties and their 
counsel signed on the date of the trial of November 19,1992, and they further testified they had reviewed the 
Plaintiffs' proposed Findings of Fact. The Stipulation is found at S.R. 177-184 and the Plaintiffs' proposed 
Findings of Fact are found at S.R. 192-206. Both the Stipulation and the proposed Findings are included in 
Plaintiffs' Addendum. 
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(a) Heather had taken the 1974 Volkswagen Bug automobile on numerous 
occasions prior to the accident on October 17, 1987, and for various types of activities such 
as going to school, going riding with friends, going to weekend parties where alcoholic 
beverages were served, etc.8 
(b) The Parents/Olsons knew Heather had taken the 1974 Volkswagen on 
occasions prior to the accident on October 17, 1987.9 
(c) Heather had consumed alcoholic beverages since the eighth grade. She 
was in the eleventh grade at the time of the accident The alcoholic beverages consisted of 
beer, white Martin wine, etc. During these two plus years, Heather consumed the alcoholic 
beverages at parties she attended with her teenage friends.10 
Judge Hanson questioned all three Olsons about their understanding of both the Stipulation and the 
Findings* See the Court Reporter's Transcript at S.R. 246-248o In these Findings, the Olsons clearly admit 
a § 316 Restatement cause of action exists and the Olsons/Parents acknowledge their negligence in not 
properly supervising and controlling their minor child Heathen The said parents also acknowledge their prior 
knowledge of Heather's drinking alcoholic beverages and her prior uses of the 1974 Volkswagen automobile* 
8See deposition of Heather's sister Heidi Nelson at S.R. 398 and 405. See also Heather's deposition at 
SoRc 470, 471, and 475. All pages from the cited depositions in this Brief are included in Plaintiffs' 
Addendum. 
9See Heather's deposition at S.R. 477. In addition there was the testimony of the Olsons/Parents and 
Heather herself at the trial. See fn. 7 above for a discussion of this trial testimony. All pages from the cited 
depositions in this Brief are included in Plaintiffs' Addendum. 
10See Heather's deposition at S.R. 478-492. See also the following depositions: Kristi Bringhurst at S.R. 
284; Jennifer Pia at S.R. 307-313; Scott Levy at S.R. 358-359,362; Mark Muir at S.R. 421-422,425; and Steven 
Kent Jones at S.R. 444-449. All pages from the cited depositions in this Brief are included in Plaintiffs' 
Addendum. 
See also pages 1 and 2 of "Statement of Stephanie Smith" taken by Frank Grant, Plaintiffs' Accident 
Reconstruction Expert ("Grant") on November 6,1987, and found in Grant's official Accident Reconstruction 
Report dated November 16, 1987 ("Report") which was Exhibit "4" admitted at trial. None of the said Trial 
Exhibits have been paginated, but they are part of the Supplemental Record from the underlying case in Judge 
Timothy R. Hanson's Court. 
See also pages 1-3 of "Statement of Michelle Paxton" dated November 3,1987, in the Grant Report. 
See also letter dated July 65 1992, at Re 98 from Olsons* counsel, Michael N. Martinez, Esq, to George R. 
Kesl, Defendant's Claims Manager, setting out pages from Heather's deposition where Heather testified about 
prior drinking parties she attended, and Mr. Martinez' belief these activities were within the coverage by the 
homeowner's Policy. 
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(d) The parents knew Heather had consumed alcoholic beverages since the 
eighth grade.11 
(e) The Plaintiffs accident reconstruction expert, Frank Grant, said in his 
opinion Heather's blood-alcohol content of .14 "indicated gross negligence and a complete 
disregard for the safety of others. See Honorable Timothy R. Hanson's trial Exhibit 4 which 
was admitted at trial.12 
(f) Heather was in the habit of taking the keys to the 1974 Volkswagen 
Bug out of her parents' dresser drawer in their bedroom. The keys were never put 
anywhere else where she would not be able to get them.13 
(g) Heather would take an old license plate from the garage of her parents' 
home and put it on the Volkswagen whenever she would take it The license plate belonged 
to her sister Heidi's former Suzuki automobile.14 
On page two of the Grant Supplemental Report dated November 21, 1987, Grant states, "Jennifer 
Olson's actions on the night of October 17, 1987, indicate gross negligence and a complete disregard for the 
safety of others." The original Grant Report dated November 16, 1987, contains photographs, witness 
statements, etc. See also Trial Exhibit "5" which is the TOXICOLOGY REPORT dated October 23, 1987, 
done by the Utah State Department of Health, State Health Laboratory, Public Safety Toxicology Section, 
showing Heather Olson had a .14 blood alcohol percentage which had been analyzed by Bruce Beck. All 
pages referred to in the three preceding paragraphs are included in Plaintiffs9 Addendum. 
nSee Olsons* Consolidated Answers to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories Nos. 35 (S.R. 90), 39 (S.R. 92), and 
Heather's deposition at S.R. 516. Furthermore, both the Olson parents and Heather testified at trial. See 
fn. 7, supra, regarding this testimony. All pages from the cited depositions in this Brief are included in 
Plaintiffs' Addendum. 
See Trial Exhibit Sheet at S.R. 176 showing Exhibit "4" was received into evidence, as were all of 
Plaintiffs' other Exhibits. 
See Olsons' Consolidated Answer to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 49 at S.R. 96. See also Heather's 
deposition at S.R. 472, 473, and 474. All pages from the cited depositions in this Brief are included in 
Plaintiffs' Addendum. 
14See Heather's deposition at S.R. 471, 472, 513, and 514. See ako page two of the Grant Report to 
Plaintiffs' counsel James A. Mcintosh dated November 16,1987. ("The license plates on the 1974 Volkswagen 
driven by Jennifer Olson [945 ARV] were registered to a 1986 Suzuki owned by Heidi Olson.") See also 
deposition of Heidi Nelson at S.R. 393 and 395. All pages from the cited depositions in this Brief are included 
in Plaintiffs' Addendum. 
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(h) On the night of the accident, Heather attended a teenage party where 
alcoholic beverages were consumed. She drank these beverages and had a blood alcohol 
content of .14 at the time of the accident15 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There are numerous reasons why this Court should affirm the action of the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel in granting the "Plaintiffs* Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Regarding Insurance Policy Liability" dated January 25,1995. These reasons are set forth 
in more detail in the first nine (9) points of this Brief. Each argument heading specifies the 
reasons why the Court should adopt the Plaintiffs' position with respect to each of the said 
argument In addition to the argument headings, the Plaintiffs submit the following 
summary* 
None of the exclusions in the Defendant's homeowner's insurance policy apply 
because each of the exclusions is expressly subject to a stated exception which provides the 
exclusions will not apply to a motor vehicle in "dead storage." As set out in the "Statement 
of the Facts," supra? the 1974 Volkswagen Bug which the minor 16-year-old child Jennifer 
Heather Olson was driving at the time of the accident was clearly in "dead storage." It was 
not licensed, it was not registered, it had no insurance, and the Olsons stated in then-
Answers to the Interrogatories that it was not to be driven, it was not roadworthy, and it 
was a car which had been purchased primarily for "remodeling." Virtually all of the cases 
which have decided this issue, under similar facts, have held the "dead storage" exception 
applies. This point is more fully discussed in POINTS, supra. 
15See Heather's deposition at S.R. 478-492. All pages from the cited depositions in this Brief are included 
in Plaintiffs5 Addendum. 
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In addition to the "dead storage" exception, which would be sufficient, by itself, to 
affirm Judge Noel's Partial Summary Judgment, it is also clear American Fire never 
intended its "exclusion11 to pertain to nonstatutorily-imposed vicarious liability on the part 
of the Parents/Olsons for the misconduct of their minor child. By limiting the exclusion to 
"statutorily"-imposed vicarious liability, it is clear the allegations in COUNT 5 of the 
underlying Taylor v. Olsons Complaint (which are not based on any Utah statutes, but rather 
upon the cause of action recognized in the common law as codified in § 316 of the 
Restatement of Torts (Second) and as adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
Drysdale v. Rogers, infra) was never intended to be covered by the exclusions. The 
homeowner's industry standard forms contain language which would have covered the 
situation in COUNT 5 of the underlying Complaint (apart from the "dead storage" issue 
which is dispositive) by simply adding the words "whether or not" statutorily imposed to the 
exclusion language. This point is more fully discussed in POINT 4, infra. 
The alleged "exclusions" are, at best, ambiguous and under the Utah law dealing with 
interpretation of insurance policies as that law was recently identified by the United States 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Worthington, infra, it is clear these ambiguities should be 
construed to provide coverage. See POINT 5. infra. 
All the cases which have dealt with fact situations similar to those in COUNT 5 of 
the underlying Complaint have held the failure of the parents to properly supervise and 
control the conduct of their minor children is a nonvehicle-related cause of action, and has 
nothing to do with the underlying "instrumentality" involving the motor vehicle. See POINT 
6, infra. 
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None of the cases cited by the Defendant in its Brief constitute a defense to the 
§ 316 cause of action in COUNTS of the underlying Complaint In POINT 7. infra, the 
Plaintiffs discuss and distinguish all of Defendant's cases. 
The Plaintiffs should be awarded their attorney fees for prosecuting this appeal in 
accordance with the provisions of the homeowner's insurance policy, the provision of Rule 
11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the ruling of Judge Noel with respect to this 
issue. See POINT 10. infra. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT BETWEEN JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON AND 
MYRA L. TAYLOR ON OCTOBER 17,1987, WAS AN OCCURRENCE AS THAT TERM 
IS DEFINED IN THE OLSONS' HOMEOWNERS' INSURANCE POLICY BECAUSE IT 
INVOLVED AN ACCIDENT, DURING THE POLICY PERIOD, WHICH RESULTED IN 
BOTH PERSONAL INJURIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE. 
In determining whether a homeowner's insurance policy ("Policy") provides coverage 
for injuries sustained by a third party, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated the analysis 
requires a two-step process. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Geary, 230 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 38, 869 P.2d 952 (Utah Ct App. 1994), citing Allstate Insurance Company v. Freeman, 
443 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Mich. 1989). First, the Court must determine whether the incident 
giving rise to the personal injuries was an "occurrence" under the homeowner's policy. 
Secondly, if the incident giving rise to the injuries was an "occurrence" the Court must next 
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determine whether the policy's exclusionary clauses apply. The Plaintiffs submit the first 
prong of this two-step process has been met in the instant case.16 
The defendant has the burden of proving Myra L. Taylor's injuries were caused 
"solely11 by a proximate cause which is excluded under the policy. If a proximate cause of 
an injury is within the included coverage of a homeowner's policy, this included coverage 
is not voided merely because an additional proximate cause of injury is a cause which is 
excluded under the policy.17 
16The Policy provides the Defendant must provide a defense and indemnification of an insured, "If a claim 
is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage 
caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies. See p. 10 of 15 in Policy under Section II, Coverage 
E-Personal Liability. In paragraph 5 of the "Definitions" section on Page 1 of 15 (see the Policy included in 
Plaintiffs' Addendum), the Policy defines the word "occurrence" to mean an accident which results, during the 
policy period, in bodily injury or property damage." 
Defendant admits its homeowner's policy, No. DHA1078159-C was in effect from October 5, 1987, 
through September 27, 1988. See p. 2 of "Brief of Appellant." The date of the accident was on October 17, 
1987. Since it is clear this case involves an "accident" between the cars driven by Jennifer Heather Olson and 
Myra L. Taylor, it follows the Defendant had a duty under the terms of the Policy to both defend the 
insureds/Olsons in the Taylor v. Olsons lawsuit as well as to indemnify the Olsons for the judgment rendered 
against them by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson in that lawsuit, unless the Policy specifically excludes all 
of the causes of action alleged in the Taylors' underlying lawsuit. 
17For cases so holding, see West American Insurance Company v. Hinze, 843 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1988) and 
other cases more fully discussed in POINT 6. infra. 
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POINT 2 
THE HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE COMPANY OCCUPIES A FIDUCIARY 
RELATIONSHIP WITH RESPECT TO ITS INSUREDS, THE OLSONS, UNDER THE 
DOCTRINE IN THE CASES OF AMMERMAN v. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
AND ITS PROGENY IN THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE WHICH 
INVOLVE A THIRD-PARTY CLAIM BY MYRA L* TAYLOR AGAINST THE INSUREDS 
OLSONS; AND THE DEFENDANT IS THEREFORE HELD TO A HIGHER STANDARD 
WITH RESPECT TO IDENTIFYING AND DISCLOSING ITS EXCLUSIONS THAN IS 
THE CASE WHERE THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP IS NOT INVOLVED. 
In Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that "because a third-party insurance contract obligates the 
insurer to defend the insured, the insurer incurs a fiduciary duly to its insured to protect 
the insured's interest as zealously as it would its own; consequently, a tort cause of action 
is recognized to remedy a violation of that duty," [emphasis added]18 
18In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court dealt with 
a first-party claim by an insured against his insurance company rather than the third-party claim which existed 
in Ammerman. However the court was quick to point out the third-party aspect made the claim a "tort" rather 
than a contract claim, and it also created a fiduciary relationship between the insurance company and its 
insured. See the court's discussion of these third-party fiduciary concepts at 701 P.2d at [3] and [4] on pp. 
799-800 of the P.2d Reports where the court stated 
This distinction (between a first-party and a third-party cause of action) is of no small 
consequence. In a third-party situation, the insurer controls the disposition of claims against 
its insured, who relinquishes any right to negotiate on his own behalf. Craft v. Economy Fire 
& Casualty Co., 572 F.2d at 569. An insurer's failure to act in good faith exposes its insured 
to a judgment and personal liability in excess of the policy limits. SantUli v. State Farm Life 
Insurance Co., 278 Or. 53, 61-62, 562 P.2d 965, 969 (1977). In essence, the contract itself 
creates a fiduciary relationship because of the trust and reliance placed in the insurer by its 
insured Cf. Hal Taylor Associates F. UnionAmerica, Inc., Utah, 657 P.2d 743, 748-49 (1982). 
The insured is wholly dependent upon the insurer to see that, in dealing with claims by third 
parties, the insured's best interest are protected, In addition, when dealing with third parties, 
the insurer acts as an agent for the insured with respect to the disputed claim Wholly apart 
from the contractual obligations undertaken by the parties, the law imposes upon all agents 
a fiduciary obligation to their principal with respect to matters falling within the scope of 
their agency [citations omitted] 
The Ammerman doctrine creating a fiduciary relationship between the insurance company and its 
insured in a third-party-claim setting was again reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in the recent case of 
Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 278 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah 1995), where the court commented on this issue 
as follows: 
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In determining whether the exclusions to the defendant's homeowner's policy apply 
to the causes of action in COUNT 5 of Myra L. Taylor's Complaint in the underlying 
lawsuit, the Utah Appellate Courts have established certain rules or standards of 
interpretation with respect to exclusions and ambiguities in insurance policies, even when 
fiduciary duties are not involved.19 The plaintiffs submit the third-party fiduciary 
relationship such as exists between the Olsons and the homeowner's insurance carrier gives 
rise to an increased standard of disclosure. 
We note as background that this court has analyzed the relationship between an 
insurer and its insured in two different contexts - first-party and third-party insurance 
policies: 
We use the term 'first-party* to refer to an insurance agreement where the insurer agrees to 
pay claims submitted to it by the insured for losses suffered by the insured. In contrast a 'third-party* 
situation is one where the insurer contracts to defend the insured against claims made by third parties 
against the insured and to pay any resolving liability up to the specified dollar limit. 
In Ammerman, we recognized a tort cause of action for breach of an insurer's obligation to 
bargain properly in the context of a third-party insurance relationship. We concluded that insureds 
have a right to expect their insurers to represent the insureds' interest by acting reasonably and in 
good faith in settling third-party claims against insureds and that under traditional agency principles, 
the insurer's contractually created duty to its insured was a fiduciary one, a breach of which sounded 
in tort. 
Savage, 278 Utah Adv. Rep. at 42. 
19In United States Fidelity <& Guaranty Company v. Sandt, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993), 
the Utah Supreme Court said any ambiguous or uncertain language in an insurance contract that is fairly 
susceptible to different interpretations should be construed in favor of coverage. If an ambiguity arises, the 
rules of construction outlined above must be employed to resolve the ambiguity. An ambiguity in a contract 
may arise (1) because of vague or ambiguous language in a particular provision, or (2) because two or more 
contract provisions, when read together, give rise to different or inconsistent meanings, even though each 
provision is clear when read alone... with respect to both types of ambiguities, the policy must be construed 
in light of how the average, reasonable purchaser of insurance would understand the language of the policy 
as a whole, citing with approval from Camp v. Deseret Mutual Benefit Association, 589 P.2d 780 (Utah 1979). 
If an insurance contract has inconsistent provisions, one which can be construed against coverage and one 
which can be construed in favor of coverage, the contract should be construed in favor of coverage. Farm 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Winters, 806 P.2d 993,996 (Kan. 1991) cited with approval in United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Company v„ Sandt, supra. Accord: DiEnes v. Safeco Life Insurance Company, 21 Utah 2d 
147,150,442 P.2d 468,471 (Utah 1968) and Whitlock v. Old American Insurance Co., 21 Utah 2d 131,135,442 
P.2d 26, 28 (Utah 1968). The Sandt case as well as several other federal cases construing Utah law with 
respect to both exclusions and ambiguities are more fully discussed in POINT 5. infra. 
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POINT 3 
NONE OF THE THREE EXCLUSIONS IN THE OLSONS' HOMEOWNERS5 
POLICY APPLY TO MYRA U TAYLOR'S UNDERLYING COMPLAINT AGAINST THE 
OLSONS BECAUSE EACH OF THE EXCLUSIONS IS SUBJECT TO A SPECIFIC 
"EXCEPTION11 STATING THE EXCLUSIONS DO NOT APPLY "TO A VEHICLE OR 
CONVEYANCE NOT SUBJECT TO MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION WHICH IS IN 
DEAD STORAGE ON AN 'INSURED LOCATION,'" AND THE VOLKSWAGEN 
JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON WAS DRIVING ON THE NIGHT OF THE ACCIDENT 
WAS IN "DEAD STORAGE" SINCE IT WAS NOT REGISTERED, INSURED, LICENSED, 
ROADWORTHY, AND WAS NOT TO BE DRIVEN ON THE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS. 
Subparagraph l.e.(4)(c) in SECTION 2 - EXCLUSIONS on page 11 of 15 of the 
Policy, American Fire states that none of its three (3) exclusions apply if the motor vehicle 
causing the accident is in "dead storage" on the insured premises. Nowhere in the 
"Definitions" section on pages 1 and 2 of 15 is the term "dead storage" defined. The 
Volkswagen automobile which Jennifer Heather Olson, the minor, was operating and using 
at the time of the accident was a vehicle in the process of being restored. It had been 
purchased some six (6) months earlier in April 1987 and was not to be taken from the 
Olsons' premises. It was not licensed, not registered, not insured, not roadworthy, and was 
not to be driven on the public highways. See S.R. 86-87 which are the Olsons' Consolidated 
Answers to Myra L. Taylor's Interrogatories Nos. 20, 21, 23, and S.R. 99-100 regarding 
Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 55. Heather testified she knew the Volkswagen was not 
driveable and she further testified her father told her it "was not a car to be driven around." 
See Heather's deposition S.R. 469. See ateo Heather's further testimony at S.R. 465-467. 
Under these circumstances it is clear the 1974 Volkswagen Bug was in "dead storage." 
In 48 AX*R. 4th 591, the annotation is entitled, "Liability Insurance: When is Vehicle 
in 'Dead Storage'." In §§ 3 and 4 in this annotation, the author discusses cases with fact 
situations very similar to those in the instant case finding a vehicle was in "dead storage" and 
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thus not subject to the exclusions in the homeowner's policy. In § 2(b) Practice Pointers 
the author cautions: 
Counsel for an insurance company should review the company's 
liability policies which employ the phrase 'dead storage' to determine if the 
words need to be further defined to avoid a potential ambiguity, as any 
ambiguity will likely be resolved against the insurance company. In order to 
clarify the meaning of 'dead storage,' policy language should specifically state 
whether or not a motor vehicle can be undergoing maintenance or repair and 
maintain its status as being in dead storage. Further, the policy should define 
'dead storage' with reference to whether the vehicle is or is not licensed, is or 
is not operative and is or is not driven on public highways. If the policy 
requires that a motor vehicle be inoperative to be considered in dead storage, 
some indication should be given as to the length of time, if any, that the 
vehicle must have been inoperative prior to the incident to render it in dead 
storage within the terms of the policy. 
Unfortunately, American Fire's counsel did not follow the advice given by the author 
of this annotation. American Fire's policy does not define the term "dead storage" 
anywhere and there are no other limiting references to that term in the policy. Under these 
circumstances it is clear the exception expressly applies to the Olsons' 1974 Volkswagen Bug 
or, in the alternative, the term Mead storage" is at best ambiguous, thereby allowing this 
Court of Appeals to construe the term most strictly against American Fire and most broadly 
in favor of coverage for the Olsons.20 
^In Nationwide Mutual Fin Insurance Company v. Allen, 68 N.C. App. 184,314 S.E. 2d 552 (1984), review 
den. 311 N.C. 761, 321 S.E. 2d 142, the court upheld the trial judge's ruling there was coverage under the 
insured's tenant/homeowner's insurance policy for certain fire damage holding the motorcycle which caused 
the fire was in dead storage within the terms of the insurance policy. The insured's motorcycle had been 
stored inoperative on the patio of insured's apartment for six (6) months. It was not registered, did not have 
a license plate, and was not covered by any motor vehicle insurance policy. These are identical facts to those 
that exist in the instant case. The Volkswagen which Jennifer Heather Olson was driving did not have a 
properly authorized license plate, rather Jennifer took her sister Heidi's old license plate and illegally fastened 
it to the Volkswagen. Furthermore, the Volkswagen was not registered, was not covered fay any motor vehicle 
insurance policy, was not roadworthy and was not to be removed from the insureds' premises. Accordingly, 
under the rationale of Allen, supra, it is clear the Volkswagen was in "dead storage" on the insured premises 
at the time of the accident. 
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Judge Noel's Minute Entry of June 22,1995 (R.1232-1234 and which is also included 
in the Plaintiffs' Addendum) does not disclose the exact basis of how he arrived at his 
determination that the Policy's three (3) exclusions did not apply. However both the 
Plaintiffs and the Defendant cited Judge Noel to the exclusions in the homeowner's policy. 
Anyone reading those "exclusions" would be on the same page as the exception in 
subparagraph Le*(4)(c) in SECTION II - EXCLUSIONS, and we can therefore assume 
Judge Noel, having had years of prior experience in insurance defense work, was very 
familiar with all of these terms, both the "exclusions" and the exception to the exclusions. 
However it is clear this issue could still be decided by this Court of Appeals even if Judge 
Noel had not taken into consideration at all the issue of the "dead storage" exception in the 
Olsons' homeowner's insurance policy, since this issue is one of law only, is dispositive of 
the entire appeal, and there is no prejudice to either party by having it decided.21 
In Beak v. Lawrence, (April 8, 1985, Tcnn. App.) Shelby Law No. 67 (available on Lexus, STATES 
library, OMNI file) where the court held that an unlicensed motor vehicle which was inoperative for several 
months and therefore not in daily use was in dead storage within the terms of the insured's homeowner's 
policy, and therefore insurance coverage was not excluded. In this case the court specifically stated a motor 
vehicle could still be in dead storage for purposes of the insurance policy even though it was undergoing 
maintenance. Clearly, the Volkswagen Bug driven by Jennifer Heather Olson at the time it crashed into Myra 
L. Taylor's vehicle, was in "dead storage" and the exclusions in the homeowner's policy cannot apply. 
In Allstate Insurance Company v. Geiwitz, 86 Md. App. 704,587 A.2d 1185 (1991), the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland held that a car which the insured had purchased solely as a collectable item, and not for 
use on public roads, was in Mead storage" and not subject to "automobile exclusions," notwithstanding that 
it was fully operational and sometimes driven from one part of the insured premises to the other. The court 
refused to adopt the reasoning of another court which had held that a vehicle undergoing maintenance could 
not also be in dead storage because the terms are mutually exclusive. The Geiwitz court noted the Beale court, 
supra, recognized a "car can undergp maintenance and still be in dead storage." This case is support for the 
instant case since the Olsons' 1974 Volkswagen Bug was purchased to be restored just like the purchase of 
the car in Geiwitz to be a collectable item. 
Based on these circumstances, it is clear the "dead storage" exception applies in the instant case, and 
this should b^ itself be sufficient justification for this Court sustaining the action of the Trial Judge Frank G. 
Noel in granting the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding insurance policy liability. 
21In this connection see 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review 361-362 at § 691, "Exceptions to general rule," 
where the author notes, "The rule that a reviewing court will address only issues raised in the trial court is not 
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POINT 4 
BY EXCLUDING ONLY STATUTORILY-IMPOSED VICARIOUS PARENTAL 
LIABILITY FOR THE ACTIONS OF A CHILD OR MINOR, IT IS CLEAR THE 
DEFENDANT INSURANCE COMPANY DID NOT INTEND TO EXCLUDE NON-
STATUTORY VICARIOUS PARENTAL LIABILITY SUCH AS IS ALLEGED IN COUNT 
5 OF MYRA L. TAYLOR'S UNDERLYING LAWSUIT AGAINST THE OLSONS. 
In its Brief, the defendant alleges Section l.e of Section II of the homeowner's policy 
specifically excludes coverage for any bodily injury or property damage arising out of the 
Taylor/Olsons accident and/or out of COUNTS in the underlying Complaint22 One of the 
three exclusions reads ff(3) statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability for the actions of 
a child or minor using a conveyance excluded in paragraph (1) or (2) above/1 By limiting 
its exclusion for "vicarious parental liability for the actions of a child or minor. . ." to only 
absolute. It is a limitation put on the parties to an appeal and not on the reviewing court and there are 
numerous situations in which a reviewing court may reach an issue notwithstanding the fact of its being 
presented for the first time on appeal." The author notes several instances where this exception applies 
including where "it is plainly decisive of the controversy on the merits and there was no possible advantage 
to be had by either party in not obtaining a ruling on it in the trial court," "it is one of law only," or when it 
involves "plain error." Obviously, in the instant case, the issue of whether the Volkswagen was in "dead 
storage" is one of law only, and it is plainly decisive of the entire controversy on the merits, and it is further 
clear no possible advantage was had by either party in not obtaining a ruling on it in the trial court. If this 
Court finds the Volkswagen Bug was in "dead storage," that finding would be dispositive of this entire appeal, 
and the exception would dictate that none of the three exclusions applied to the facts in Count 5 of Ms. 
Taylor's underlying lawsuit. 
In Re Estate ofAbesy, 470 N.W. 2d 713 (Minn. App. 1991), the court recognized an appellate court 
may consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal if it is plainly decisive of the entire controversy on 
its merits and if there is no possible advantage or disadvantage to either party in not having had prior ruling 
by trial court on the question. And in Cock v. Rodlin Enterprises, Inc., 273 CaL Rptr. 438 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 
1990), the court held that even the appellant may raise an argument for the first time on appeal where the 
facts are not disputed and the issue merely raises new questions of law. 
In the instant case, the Defendant admits the Volkswagen Bug was not registered, was not licensed, 
was not insured, was not roadworthy, and the Olsons/Parents had instructed Jennifer Heather Olson to keep 
the Volkswagen on the insured premises and not to take it off the premises. Under these circumstances, it 
is clear the Volkswagen was in "dead storage," and the exception in subparagraph l.e.(4)(c) in SECTION II -
EXCLUSIONS on page 11 of 15 of the Policy applies. Consequently, none of the three (3) "exclusions" cited 
by the Defendant in its Brief apply, and the "dead storage" exception is dispositive of this entire appeal. 
aSee p. 7 of "Brief of Appellant." 
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those "statutorily-imposed," it is clear the defendant did not intend to exclude vicarious 
parental liability which is non-statutorily imposed or which exists under the common law as 
codified in § 316 of the Restatement of Torts (Second) and which deals with those facts in 
COUNTS of the underlying Taylor/Olsons Complaint See Drysdale v. Rogers discussed in 
detail in Point 6, infra, where the Utah Court of Appeals recognized and adopted a § 316 
cause of action such as is alleged in COUNT 5 of the underlying Taylor/Olsons lawsuit 
Had the defendant wanted to exclude the situation in COUNT 5 of the Complaint 
(except for the exception discussed in POINTS, supra, of the vehicle being in "dead storage" 
which is dispositive of this entire appeal) it could easily have done so by rewording this 
exclusion to read the way it is customarily done in the insurance industry, to wit, "(3) 
Vicarious liability, whether or not statutorily imposed, for the actions of a child or minor 
using a conveyance excluded in paragraph (1) or (2) above*" By simply adding the three 
words "whether or not" after the words vicarious liability, any doubt regarding this matter 
would be removed. This standard language is acknowledged in many industry-wide 
publications. See Miller's Standard Insurance Policies Annotated, Vol. I at p. 215, a copy of 
which page is included in the Plaintiffs Addendum. As the Tenth Circuit noted in 
Worthington, infra, if American Fire wants its homeowner's insurance policy to exclude the 
nonstatutory involved parental vicarious liability".. .it can do so by careful drafting," which 
it is obvious the Defendant neglected to do in its homeowner's policy in the instant case. 
The failure of the defendant to use this standard language is fatal with respect to its 
alleged defense in COUNT 5 in the instant case. By limiting its exclusion to only vicarious 
liability which is "statutorily imposed," and not including vicarious liability "whether or not" 
statutorily imposed, American Fire has no defense or exclusion which addresses the cause 
of action in COUNT 5 of the Complaint alleging the common-law vicarious liability cause 
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of action found in § 316 of the Restatement Under these circumstances, it is clear the 
defendant had a duty to defend the Olsons in the underlying lawsuit and should be held to 
pay all damages incurred by the Olsons in that lawsuit and Judge Noel's granting Summary 
Judgment to the Plaintiffs can be sustained solely on this one issue. 
POINTS 
THE SAID HOMEOWNER'S POLICY IS AMBIGUOUS WITH RESPECT TO 
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT INTENDED TO EXCLUDE NON-STATUTORILY 
IMPOSED VICARIOUS LIABILITY SUCH AS IS ALLEGED IN COUNT 5 OF THE 
UNDERLYING LAWSUIT BETWEEN MYRA L. TAYLOR AND THE OLSONS AND IS 
ALSO AMBIGUOUS WITH RESPECT TO THE OTHER EXCLUSIONS RELIED ON BY 
THE DEFENDANT. 
On page 16 of its Brief the Defendant says, "The homeowner's insurance contract at 
issue in this litigation is in no way ambiguous in its exclusion of coverage for those claims 
asserted by Appellees." [emphasis added] This comment is made without any citation to 
or discussion of even one case from Utah talking about what constitutes an "ambiguity." 
Furthermore, defendant has not related any Utah law to any of the facts in COUNT 5 of 
Ms. Taylor's underlying Complaint to show why no ambiguity exists. No effort has been 
made by the defendant to refer this Court to any specific language in the Taylor Complaint 
which the Defendant claims is not ambiguous. This Court has only the statement of 
Defendant's counsel to support the conclusion. Without the help of Utah law dealing with 
what constitutes an ambiguity, this Court has absolutely nothing to help it either understand 
or adopt Defendant's position. 
POINT 2. supra, discusses the fiduciary relationship between the Olsons and the 
insurer. In the case of United Skdes Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Sandt, supra, the Utah 
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Supreme Court established numerous guidelines with respect to exclusions and ambiguities 
in insurance policies.23 
23
 1. "Since 1921 this Court has expressed its commitment to the principle that 'insurance policies 
should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat 
the purposes of insurance, [citations omitted] In construing a policy of life insurance, that interpretation is 
to be placed upon the words of the policy which is most favorable to the insured. This fundamental rule is 
based on the fact that an insurance policy is a classic example of an adhesion contract. Page 522 of the P.2d 
Rep. 
2. "Insurance contracts are typically drafted by insurance company attorneyswho are duty-bound 
to protect the interests of their clients. The terms of a typical insurance policy are not negotiated by the 
insurer and the insured. A policy is usually offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In 1937, this Court described 
the one-sided manner in which insurance contracts are drafted: 
Insurance policies, while in the nature of written contracts, are not prepared after 
negotiations between the parties, to embrace the terms at which the parties have arrived in 
their negotiations. They are prepared beforehand by the insurer, and the company solicitors 
then sell the insurance idea to the applicant. Normally, the details and provisions of the 
policy are not discussed, except that the particular form of policy is best suited to give the 
applicant the protection he seeks. If he reads the policy he is generally not in a position to 
understand its details, terms, and meaning except that, in the event against which he seeks 
insurance, the company will pay the stipulated sums. He seldom sees the policy until it has 
been issued and is delivered to him* He signs an application blank in which the policy sought 
is described either by form number or by general description, pays his premium, and in due 
course thereafter receives, either from the agent or through the mails, his policy. Many of 
its terms and all of its defenses and super-refinements he has never heard of and would not 
understand them if he read theme Such fact is evident from the fact that cases like this arise 
where lawyers and courts disagree as to what such provisions mean. In fact, there are about 
as many different constructions by the courts of terms such as those involved here as there 
are insurance companies issuing such policies. For this reason the rule olstrictissimi juris has 
been applied almost universally to insurance contracts, and this jurisdiction, like many others, 
has declared in favor of a liberal construction in favor of the insured to accomplish the 
purpose for which the insurance was taken out and for which the premium was paid. Id. page 
522. [emphasis added] 
3. "It follows that ambiguous or uncertain language in an insurance contract that is fairly 
susceptible to different interpretations should be construed in favor of coverage, [numerous citations omitted] 
It also follows that if an insurance contract has inconsistent provisions, one which can be construed against 
coverage and one which can be construed in favor of coverage, the contract should be construed in favor of 
coverage, [citations omitted] A corollary to these rules is that provisions that limit or exclude coverage should 
be strictly construed against the insurer, [numerous citations omitted] Id. at pages 522-523. 
4. "Because insurance policies are intended for sale to the public, the language of an insurance 
contract must be interpreted and construed as an ordinary purchaser of insurance would understand it. 
[citations omitted] (An insured is entitled to the broadest coverage he could reasonably understand from the 
policy.) Id. at pages 522. 
5. "If an ambiguity arises, the rules of construction outlined above must be employed to resolve 
the ambiguity. An ambiguity in a contract may arise (1) because of vague and ambiguous language in a 
particular provision; or (2) because two or more contract provisions when read together, give rise to different 
or inconsistent meanings, even though each provision is clear when read alone. The policy in the instant case 
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In Allstate Insurance Company v. Worthington, supra, the United States Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals interpreting Utah law said, "Based on Utah law that contracts of insurance 
are to be construed in favor of the insured, particularly exclusionary clauses, we hold that 
Allstate has a duty to defend suits alleging Brown's negligence and, if liability is imposed, 
to indemnify Brown even though her coinsured is denied coverage because of his intentional 
or criminal acts." [emphasis added] Furthermore, "Limitations on insurance coverage must 
be effected through an exclusion clause with language that clearly identifies the scope of the 
limitation to the reasonable purchaser of insurance/124 
Applying these rules of construction to the homeowner's policy in the instant case, 
it is clear there are several "ambiguities'1 which are not explained or resolved or disclosed 
within the four corners of the policy itself.25 
contains both types of ambiguity. With respect to both types of ambiguity, the policy must be construed in 
light of how the average, reasonable purchaser of insurance would understand the language of the policy as 
a whole, [citations omitted] [emphasis added] Id. at page 523. 
^In Wolf v. Prudential Insurance Company, 50 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995), the United States Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals noted a split of authority in construing exclusions and other terms in an insurance policy 
is sufficient by itself to make the terms ambiguous. See Wolf at 50 F.3d at 800 fn 11. Likewise, in Douglass 
ve Hartford Insurance Company, 602 F.2d 934 (10th Cir., 1979), the Court found an ambiguity existed in a 
contract with respect to whether the term "negligent entrustmentn was the same as "use, ownership, and 
operation" of a motor vehicle. The court recognized there was a split of authority on this issue, and because 
of that split of authority found an ambiguity existed. ("We disagree with the Massachusetts court that these 
provisions are plain and free from ambiguity, since a number of courts have been presented with the identical 
issue and are divided as to the proper interpretation. A majority (4-3) appear to support the result reached 
by the trial judge here.") 
The United States District Court for the District of Utah in Overtkrust Constructors, Inc. v. Home 
Insurance Company, supra, stated "the insurer has an obligation to defend and afford coverage despite an 
honest belief on the part of the insured that there is no coverage. . .since the insurer should be held to a 
higher degree of knowledge than the insured, [citations omitted] Second, if an ambiguity exists, as is argued 
by Overthrusty it would not alter the result reached here. Ordinarily, summary judgment is defeated if an 
ambiguity exists in a contract that creates a genuine issue as to some material fact as to what the parties 
intended. However an insurance policy is at issue in this case* Because insurance policies are drafted by the 
insurer, ambiguities are construed against the insurer and resolved in favor of coverage." [emphasis added] 
1. What does the insurer mean by the "dead storage" exception to its three exclusions. This 
"exception" is in subparagraph l.e.(4)(c) in SECTION II - EXCLUSIONS.on page 11 of 15 of the Policy. 
Nowhere in the "definitions" section on pages 1 and 2 of 15 is the term "dead storage" defined. Since the 
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Volkswagen automobile which Jennifer Heather Olson, the minor, was operating and using at the time of the 
accident, was not licensed, not registered, not insured, not roadworthy, and was to be confined to the insured 
premises, it appears clear this vehicle was in Mead storage.," This issue of the "dead storage" exception to the 
three (3) exclusions is discussed more fully in POINT 3„ infra. 
2. As discussed more fully in POINT 4. supra, the homeowner's policy excludes bodily injury 
arising out of "(3) statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability for the actions of a child or minor using a 
conveyance excluded in paragraph (1) or (2) above." However, nothing is said about non-statutorily imposed 
vicarious parental liability for the actions of a child such as exists in COUNTS of the underlying Complaint 
and such as is discussed in § 316 of the Restatement of Torts (Second). In POINT 4, the Plaintiffs take the 
position the failure to include non-statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability means that this cause of 
action as set forth in COUNTS of the Complaint was not intended to be excluded. In the alternative, the 
plaintiffs now submit the exclusion is ambiguous because it does not use language excluding "non-statutorily 
imposed" vicarious liability. As discussed in POINT 4. supra, the industry standard for language pertaining 
to these types of exclusions adds the words "whether or not" to the exclusion so it would then read 
(3) Vicarious liability, whether or not statutorily imposed, for the actions of a child 
or minor using a conveyance excluded in paragraph (1) or (2) above, [emphasis added] A 
copy of this language is found in Miller's STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES 
ANNOTATED in Vol. I at page 215, and a copy is included in the Plaintiffs Addendum and 
is by reference incorporated herein and made a part hereof. Under these circumstances, it 
appears clear an "ambiguity" exists under the reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court in Sandt, 
supra. 
3. In POINT 6, infra, the Plaintiffs have discussed numerous cases holding that a cause of action 
such as stated in COUNTS of the underlying Complaint is based on § 316 of the Restatement of Torts. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has explicitly adopted § 316 of the Restatement in the case of Drysdale v. Rogers 
(1994), infra. Drysdale holds a parent would be liable for the negligent driving of an automobile by the 
parents' minor child, which is exactly the situation in the instant case. These cases hold the cause of action 
for a "negligent failure of the parents to properly supervise and control the activities of a minor child" is a 
different cause of action than "negligent entrustment" as in COUNT 4 of the underlying Complaint and is also 
a different cause of action than in COUNT 1 of the Complaint alleging negligent use and operation of a motor 
vehicle. 
On the other hand, the defendant insurance carrier has cited cases in Point 1 of its Brief which it 
alleges covers the situation in COUNT 5. In POINT 7. infra, the Plaintiffs have discussed every one of the 
cases cited by the Defendant and has shown why those cases do not apply and why several of them are actually 
support for the Plaintiffs' position with respect to COUNT 5. However, even assuming the cases cited by 
Defendant did apply, the resulting split of authority constitutes, by itself, an ambiguity as to whether the 
exclusions cover the circumstances in COUNT 5. In this connection see the United States Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals case of Wolfv* Prudential Ins* Co. of America, supra, where the Tenth Circuit recognized there was 
a split of authority with respect to how certain terms in an insurance policy should be interpreted. Based on 
that split of authority, by itself, the Tenth Circuit held an "ambiguity" was thereby created. In footnote 11 on 
page 800 of the Federal 3rd Reports, the court said: 
lie We are not necessarily implying that Prudential has taken this position in this 
litigation. We do note that coverage under undefined experimental exclusions, particularly 
for HDC/ABMT treatments, has been a frequently litigated issue. Since February 1989, we 
have found 24 published federal cases construing this exclusion [for experimental services]. 
This amount of litigation reveals the uncertainty caused by undefined experimental procedure 
exclusions for insurance consumers and litigants alike, [citations omitted] We also note that 
Prudential has been involved in disputes over coverage for HDC/ABMT under policies 
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For the above reasons, the Plaintiffs submit there are at least the four (4) ambiguities 
containing undefined experimental exclusions since at least 1989. [citation omitted] Adverse 
court decisions involving coverage for HCD/ABMThave forced at least one insurer to change 
its coverage position, [emphasis added] 
Similarly, in the instant case, the litigation involving whether exclusions (pertaining to the (1) use and 
operation of a motor vehicle, (2) negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle, and (3) statutorily imposed 
vicarious liability) are also meant to apply to a § 316 Restatement of Torts cause of action as in COUNTS 
of the underlying Complaint would, as a minimum, create an "ambiguity.," According to Wolf, this amount of 
litigation requires this Court to find an "ambiguity" exists, and this Court should find that American Fire's 
exclusion does not apply to the cause of action in COUNT 5 of the underlying Complaint. 
4. The three (3) exclusions in paragraph le. on page 11 of 15 of the Policy also create an 
ambiguity. American Fire argues these exclusions limit the amount of damages for personal injuries or 
property damages: 
e. Arising out of: 
(1) The ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of 
motor vehicles or all other motorized land conveyances, including trailers, 
owned or operated by or rented or loaned to an insured; 
(2) The entrustment by an insured by a motor vehicle or any 
other motorized land conveyance to any person; or 
(3) Statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability for the 
actions of a child or minor using a conveyance excluded in paragraph (1) or 
(2) above. 
This exclusion does not apply to: 
* * * 
For a motor vehicle or conveyance not subject to motor vehicle registration which 
is 
• * • 
(c) in dead storage on an insured location. 
If, as the Defendant contends in its Brief, the first exclusion regarding the ownership, use and loading 
of motor vehicles, was intended to be all-encompassing, why did the Defendant then use the other two 
exclusions dealing with "negligent entrustment" and "statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability for the 
actions of a child or minor?" If the Defendant realty felt the first exemption was all-encompassing, then there 
would be no reason for exclusion (2) or exclusion (3). The fact the Defendant saw fit to increase the number 
of exclusions from one (1) to three (3) indicates the Defendant felt uncomfortable with the argument it is 
making in its Brief that exclusion (1) covered the other two situations. Under these circumstances, it is clear 
exclusion (1) would not cover exclusion (2) or exclusion (3), and further would not cover the circumstances 
in COUNTS of the Myra Taylor's underlying Complaint. Had the Defendant wanted to include § 316 of the 
Restatement in its exclusions, it could easily have done so by either adding a new exclusion (4) or it could have 
changed its exclusion (3) to be all-encompassing with respect to vicarious parental liability by adding the three 
simple words "whether or not" as discussed more fully in POINT 4, supra. 
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discussed above with respect to the ''exclusionary" language in the Defendant's insurance 
policy. Under the time-honored standards for interpreting policies, this Court must honor 
precedent and hold that since the exclusions are ambiguous, coverage is broadly afforded 
to the insured, and Judge Frank G. Noel was correct in his granting of partial Summary 
Judgment to the Plaintiffs with respect to the liability on the homeowner's insurance 
policy.26 
POINT 6 
THE OLSONS' HOMEOWNERS' INSURANCE POLICYCOVERS THE CAUSE OF 
ACTION IN COUNT 5 OF MYRA L. TAYLOR'S UNDERLYING COMPLAINT AGAINST 
THE OLSONS WHICH IS BASED ON § 316 OF THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
(SECOND) ALLEGING FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE PARENTS/OLSONS TO 
PROPERLY SUPERVISE AND CONTROL THE CONDUCT OF THEIR MINOR CHILD 
JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently approved the cause of action described in 
§ 316 Restatement (Second) Torts (1965) stating that, "a parent is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care so to control his minor child." See, Drysdale v. Rogers, 211 Adv. Rep. 9, 869 
P.2d 1 (Utah Ct App. 1994). Drysdale involved factual circumstances similar to the cause 
of action in COUNTS of the Complaint in the Taylor/Olsons Lawsuit and the court cited 
with approval §§ 315 and 316, Restatement (Second) Torts (1965), which describe a cause 
of action when a parent fails to adequately supervise and control their minor child. In 
Drysdale, the defendant/child was an adult, so the Court held there could be no liability on 
the part of the parents. However the Court recognized if the Child had been a minor the 
Accord: West American Ins. Co. v. Silverman, 378 So. 2d 28 (Fla. App. 1980); Government Emp. Ins. Co. 
vc CHAHALIS, 72 Misc. 2d 207, 333 N.Y. S. 2d 348 (1972); Smith v. USAA Cos. Ins. Co., 532 So. 2d 1171 (La. 
App. 4 Cir. 1988); and McDonald v. Home Ins. Co., 235 A.2d 480, 97 NJ. Super 501 (1967). 
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result would have been different ("The fact that Billy Rogers is a non-minor is a critical 
factor in this analysis. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316 (1965) stating that 
'[a] parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so as to control his minor child'" 
[emphasis added].) See, also, footnote 2 in Drysdale where the Court distinguished cases 
which imposed liability on the part of the parents for their child's traffic accident where the 
child was a minor.27 
Surprisingly, American fire has failed to cite Drysdale in its Brief, even though it was cited by Plaintiffs 
in their Memoranda in support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and was discussed extensively 
both in the said Memoranda and at Judge NoePs May 24,1995 hearing where he granted Plaintiffs' Motion 
on this point, and even though it is the only Utah Appellate case discussing a parent's duty to supervise and 
control the conduct of their minor child when driving an automobile — all in the context of claims made 
pursuant to the parents' homeowners' Policy! Defendant's failure to bring this case to the Court's attention 
is a tacit admission the Defendant does not want to make a full disclosure of recent Utah case law which is 
dispositive of the issue raised by the Defendant on this appeal, when that case law goes contrary to argument 
taken by the Defendant in its Brief* 
The Defendant seeks to exclude coverage because of the language in the Policy exclusions for any 
bodily injury or property damage arising out of: 
(1) The ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of motor vehicles or all other 
motorized land conveyances, including trailers, owned or operated by or rented or loaned to an insured; 
(2) The entrustment by an insured of a motor vehicle or other motorized land 
conveyance to any person;... 
(3) Statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability for the actions of a child or minor using 
a conveyance excluded in paragraphs (1) or (2) above. See "Statement of Facts" on p.7; "Summary of 
Arguments" on pp. 14-15 of "Brief of Appellant;" and R.43. All of the cases cited by Defendant in POINT 
I on pp. 16-27 of its Brief are fully discussed by Plaintiffs in POINT 7. infra. 
Judge Hanson made specific findings of fact dealing with the failure of the Olson parents to supervise 
and control the activities of their 16-year-old minor daughter, Jennifer Heather Olson. See, paragraphs 23, 
28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39, and 40 of Judge Hanson's Findings of Fact ("Findings"), which are 
included in the Plaintiffs' Addendum and which are also found at S.R. 210-224. The findings were all based 
on sufficient evidence including the testimony of all three Olsons. See "Statement of the Facts," supra, which 
references to depositions, discovery documents, exhibits, and other portions of the official record in Judge 
Hanson's Court, as well as the testimony of all three Olsons/Defendants. In paragraph 23 of the said Findings, 
the Court specifically found " . • • the parents9 lack of supervision and control over the minor child was the 
sole, direct and proximate cause of the accident for the reasons stated in this paragraph and for the other 
reasons more fully described in COUNTS of the Complaint, all of which the Court finds are fully established 
by the evidence in this case." [emphasis added] COUNT 5 incorporates the allegations in the other four 
counts and then discusses additional factual circumstances giving rise to the separate cause of action dealing 
with the Parents/Olsons' failure to properly supervise and control the conduct of their minor child Jennifer 
Heather Olson. A copy of Myra L. Taylor's Complaint is included in the Plaintiffs' Addendum and is also 
found at S.R. 1-14. 
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In Allstate Insurance Co. v, Worthington, 46 Fed.3d 1005 (10th Cir. 1995) the United 
States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found certain exclusionary language in a 
homeowners' insurance policy to be ambiguous and held the insurance company was 
obligated to defend its insured, Karen Worthington Brown, in a civil wrongful-death action 
brought by the estate of a nurse at Alta Health Care who was killed by Karen's ex-husband, 
another insured, Richard Worthington. The Court stated, "Limitations on insurance 
coverage must be effected through an exclusion clause with language that clearly identifies 
the scope of the limitation to the reasonable purchaser of insurance..." [emphasis added] 
(Citing Draughon v. Cuna Mutual Insurance Society, 111 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah Ct App. 
1989.)28 The Court noted Utah looks to the actual allegations of negligence and not the 
"underlying instrumentality" which caused the accident ("As stated above, we believe Utah 
would more likely follow the courts that look to the actual allegations of negligence and not 
the "underlying actions*") See Worthington at p. 1010c29 In this connection, the Court at 
p. 1010 of the Fed.3d Rep, commented 
In any event, our review indicates that the Utah courts have not 
specifically adopted nor rejected the view that negligent acts or omissions 
connected to intentional acts of other insureds are never covered by 
homeowner's liability policies. Therefore, based on the Utah policies of 
construing exemptions against the insurance company and of focusing on 
individual responsibility, see Error v. Western Home Ins. Co., 762 P,2d 1077 
(Utah 1988), we believe the district court correctly focused on the cause of 
action against the insured for whom the company is attempting to deny 
As discussed in POINT 2, supra, the defendant owes its insureds/Olsons a higher degree of disclosure 
with respect to its exclusions because of the fiduciary relationship it occupies to the Olsons in the context of 
a third-party claim by Myra L. Taylor under the doctrine enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Ammerman and its progeny. 
^("In so holding, we also reject Allstate's argument that we should look to the 'underlying cause of the 
injury" to determine whether Brown is covered.") 
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coverage - here, Brown's negligence. See Catholic Diocese v. Raymer, 251 Kan. 
689, 840 P.2d 456, 461 (Kan. 1992) (looking to specific theory of liability 
alleged rather than underlying cause of injury to determine insurance 
coverage). If Allstate wants its homeowner's insurance policies to exclude 
coverage for all insured persons for an excluded act by any insured person, 
it can do so by careful drafting, [emphasis added] 
The Worthington case is significant with respect to the issues before this Court, 
because the Tenth Circuit interpreted Utah law to look to the specific theory of liability 
alleged rather than the underlying instrument or cause of injury to determine insurance 
coverage.30 
30Throughout its Brief, Defendant American Fire and Casualty Company asks this Court to disregard the 
"cause of action" in COUNT S of the underlying complaint in the Taylor v. Olsons9 lawsuit and to further 
disregard the specific theory of liability alleged and to instead look at the underlying cause of the injury or 
the instrumentality involved. If the Worthington court is accurate in its appraisal of Utah law in dealing with 
homeowners5 insurance policies by looking to the specific theory of liability alleged rather than to the 
underlying cause or instrumentality of injury, this would seem to dispose of all of the arguments in the 
Defendant's Brief and would support the Plaintiffs' position that COUNTS of the underlying complaint is 
covered by the homeowner's policy. 
With respect to these same Utah rules or standards of interpretation of insurance contracts, the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah agrees with the comments by the Tenth Circuit in 
Worthington. See Overthrust Constructors, Inc. v. Home Insurance Co., 676 Fed. Supp. 1086 (Utah 1987) where 
the court noted a significant distinction between an insurance policy and an ordinary contract: 
Home Insurance urges that contribution claims are excluded under the policy in this 
case because Overthrust itself regarded the exclusion as broad enough to bar suits for 
contribution and acknowledged that third party contribution claims were not covered. Home 
Insurance's argument makes no difference here for two reasons. First, '[t]he insurer has an 
obligation to defend and afford coverage despite an honest belief on the part of the insured 
that there is no coverage . . • Since the insurer should be held to a higher degree of 
knowledge than the insured/ 7 C. J. Appleman Insurance Law and Practice § 4684.01, at 
101 (Berdal Ed. 1979). Second, if an ambiguity exists as is argued by Overthrust, it would 
not alter the result reached here. Ordinarily, summary judgment is defeated if an ambiguity 
exists in a contract that creates a genuine issue as to some material fact as to what the 
parties intended. However, an insurance policy is at issue in this case. Because insurance 
policies are drafted by the insurer, ambiguities are construed against the insurer and result 
in favor of coverage." [emphasis added] 
Using these standards or rules of interpretation (above in this POINT 6 and also as discussed in 
POINT 2. supra, and in POINT 7, infra), as enunciated by the Utah Appellate Courts and as recognized by 
the United States District Court for the District of Utah and the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
when interpreting Utah law, it is clear this Court must construe COUNTS of the underlying complaint by 
looking at the "cause of action1* alleged in the said COUNTS and not at the underlying instrumentality which 
caused the accident, to wit, the Volkswagen automobile Heather was driving at the time of the accident, as 
urged by the Defendant in its Brief. 
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In West American Insurance Company v. Hinze, 843 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1988), the 
United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously held a motor-vehicle exclusion 
in a homeowner's policy did not exclude a child's death which arose from negligent 
supervision and, therefore, the insurer had a duty to defend under the homeowner's policy. 
In West American, Richard Hinze was baby-sitting his three-year-old grandson. Hinze drove 
to the Montrose Harbor West compound with his grandson and stopped the automobile at 
a storage area near an open gate. While Hinze was in the restaurant, the automobile, with 
the three-year-old grandson inside, rolled out of the storage area and into Lake Michigan, 
causing the minor child to be killed. The administrator of the minor child's estate sued 
Hinze in the Illinois State Court alleging both negligent operation of the automobile and 
"negligent supervision" of the three-year-old child. Thereafter, West American filed a 
declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois asking that Court to rule the homeowner's policy did not apply because of the 
motor vehicle exclusions in the policy — which exclusions are identical to those raised by 
the defendant in the instant case. 
Other Federal and State Courts which have had occasion to construe a cause of action under § 316 
of the Restatement of Torts (2d Ed.) as more fully described in COUNT 5 of Myra L. Taylor's underlying 
complaint, have held the said claim for failure to properly supervise and control the conduct of a minor child 
is not included in any of the three exclusions discussed by American Fire in its Brief. Rather, these Courts 
have consistently held the allegations of "failure to properly supervise and control the conduct of a minor 
child" is nonautomobile-related, even though the instrumentality in the underlying occurrence involves an 
automobile0 These same Courts recognize the elements of the cause of action in COUNTS are substantially 
different from the elements needed to prove the causes of action in COUNT 1 (Negligent Use and Operation 
of a Motor Vehicle) and COUNT 4 (Negligent Entrustment) of Ms. Taylor's underlying complaint. 
Again, it is significant even though many of these cases were cited and discussed in detail by Plaintiffs 
in their Memoranda in support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and at Judge NoePs May 24, 
1995 hearing on the Motion,, Defendant has failed, refused and neglected to acknowledge, cite, or discuss any 
of these cases in its Brief, Again, Defendant's failure to do so is a tacit admission Defendant cannot 
distinguish the holding of these cases with respect to causes of action such as are found in COUNTS of Ms. 
Taylor's underlying Complaint. 
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The U.S. District Court trial judge ruled the automobile exclusion clause applied to 
the cause of action dealing with the negligent operation of the automobile, however, it did 
not apply to the "negligent supervision" claim. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge. 
The Court noted West American relied principally on the case of State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Company v. McGlawn, 84 Hi App, 3rd 107, 404 N.E.2d 1122 (1980). However, the Court 
noted McGlawn involved a negligent "entrustment" of a motor vehicle to a minor — not a 
negligent supervision claim. The Court held the elements of these two causes of action 
were entirely different. The insurance company argued that a claim for coverage cannot be 
considered without an examination of the instrumentality of the loss, and when the 
instrumentality is a motor vehicle, the exclusion clause precludes coverage. This is exactly 
the position taken by the Defendant in the instant case throughout its Brief.31 
However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning in two other 
cases decided by the Illinois State Courts, to wit, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 107 111. App. 3rd 190, 437 N.E.2d 663 (1982) 
("First U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company appeal") and U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company 
v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 152 Dl. App. 3rd 346, 504 N.E.2d 123 (1987) 
("Second U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company appeal"). The Seventh Circuit Court quoted 
with approval from the Second U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company appeal case as follows: 
If a proximate cause of an injury is within the included coverage of an 
automobile policy, the included coverage is not voided merely because an 
additional proximate cause of injury is a cause which is excluded under the 
policy. Thus, in order for an injury to be excluded from the coverage under 
an insurance policy? the injury must have been caused "solely" by a proximate 
cause which is excluded under the policy. The insurance company has the 
31See "Brief of Appellant" at pp. 14 and 15, "Summary of Arguments;" and also at pp. 17,18, 20, 22 and 
23. 
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burden of proof as to whether the injury was caused 'solely' by a proximate 
cause which is excluded under the policy [emphasis added].32 
In these two U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company cases, the Complaints contained two counts. COUNT 
I alleged the defendants (Happyland and its employee Patricia Petersen) were negligent in operating a day-
care center; in failing to provide sufficient personnel to adequately care for the children; and in failing to 
retain sufficient control and discipline over the children; in failing to provide adequate supervision for the 
children. The employee/driver Petersen was transporting some children who attended Happyland to a dance 
class in an automobile owned by Happyland. A four-year-old girl was injured when she "fell from, was thrown 
from, or otherwise exited" the automobile. 
COUNT II of the Complaint alleged the defendants negligently operated the automobile; failed to 
provide sufficient personnel; failed to retain sufficient control and discipline over the children; violated the 
Municipal Code of Chicago in that the automobile was not equipped with safety devices which would make 
it impossible for a passenger to open the vehicle from the inside; failed to operate the automobile properly 
and with sufficient regard for the care and safety of its passengers; and failed to provide adequate safety 
devices to prevent injury to the plaintiff. 
The Illinois state court in the First U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company case (437 N.E. 2nd 663, 665) 
acknowledged this was a case of first impression and it was persuaded by the reasoning of the Courts in 
California and Louisiana. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v« Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 109 
Cal. Rptr. 811, 514 P,2d 123 (1973); Johns ^ State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 349 So.2d 481 (La. App. 1977) 
and Frader v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 347 Soc 2d 1275 (La. App. 1977). 
Surprisingly, the Defendant has omitted any citation to or discussion of Partridge even though other cases 
cited by Defendant recognize Partridge as the leading case In California in fact situations involving (1) 
homeowners9 policies? (2) automobile exclusions, and (3) causes of action in the complaint directed to both 
auto related conduct and nonauto-related conduct — in other words, the ingredients found in the instant case 
in this Court In Partridge, a man had filed the trigger mechanism of his hunting pistol When his vehicle 
drove off the paved road onto some rough terrain, the vehicle hit a bump and the pistol discharged injuring 
one of the passengers. The trial Court found the insured had been negligent in modifying his gun and also 
in driving the vehicle. The Court found that these two negligent acts were independent, concurrent proximate 
causes of the passenger's injuries. The insured's homeowner's policy contained an exclusion for "bodily injury 
arising out of the use of any motor vehicle.w 
The California Court in Partridge found there was coverage in the broad personal liability 
comprehensive provisions of the homeowner's policy and stated as follows: 
. . . although the homeowner's policy excluded injuries 'arising out of the use' of the 
automobile, such exclusion does not preclude coverage when an accident results from the 
concurrence of a non-auto-related cause and an auto-related cause* The comprehensive 
personal liability coverage of the homeowner's policy affords the insured protection for 
liability accruing generally from non-auto-related risks. Whenever such a non-auto risk is a 
proximate cause of an injury? liability attaches to the insured, and coverage for such liability 
should naturally folloWc Coverage cannot be defeated simply because a separate excluded 
risk constitutes an additional cause of the injury. 
[9] In the instant case, *** although the accident occurred in a vehicle, the insured's 
negligent modification of the gun suffices, in itself, to render him fully liable for the resulting 
injuries... Inasmuch as the liability of the insured arises from the non-auto-related conduct, 
and exists independently of any 'use' of his car, we believe the homeowner's policy covers that 
liability. 109 Cal. Rptr. at 813, 812, 514 P.2d at 125,129 [emphasis added] 
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In West American, supra, the Seventh Circuit noted that in the Second US. Fidelity 
& Guaranty Company appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that one claim which went 
to the jury was negligent supervision of the children, and since it was not appealed it 
became a final judgment Therefore, "negligent supervisionH was a proximate cause of the 
injury. As the record did not indicate that "negligence with an automobile" was the "sole" 
proximate cause, the Seventh Circuit ruled the exclusion clause did not preclude the 
coverage. Similarly, in the instant case, American Fire has not sustained its burden to show 
the "negligence with the Olsons' Volkswagen" was the "sole" proximate cause of the injury. 
Judge Hanson made no such findings and the defendant cannot cite this Court to any 
evidence in the underlying lawsuit to help it in sustaining its burden in this regard. Finally, 
The US. Fidelity & Guaranty Company Court noted the Complaint "alleges negligent acts which are 
potentially within the coverage of the policy, such as the failure to adequately supervise the children and the 
negligent operation of a day-care center. These alleged acts are separate and distinct from the allegations 
relating to the negligent operation of the automobile. If it is ultimately determined that the insureds are 
guilty of these acts, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company could be liable under the policy." [emphasis added] 
In the Second US. Fidelity & Guaranty Company appeal, supra, after a trial had been held and a jury 
returned a verdict for $2,350,787 in favor of the four-year-old minor child who was rendered a quadriplegic, 
with impaired sight and severely limited speech, the Court noted COUNT I of the Complaint alleged the 
proximate cause of the child's injuries "was a failure to provide sufficient and adequate supervision of the 
children," whereas COUNT II was an allegation the day-care center's employee failed to properly operate and 
maintain a station wagon. The Court noted U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company argued — exactly as the 
defendant American Fire and Casualty Company argues in the instant case — that the automobile exclusion 
applied "because the injuries could not have occurred without the operation or use of the station wagon..." 
The Court held U.S. fidelity & Guaranty Company's argument overlooked the fact there may be more 
than one proximate cause of an injury. "A proximate cause of an injury is any cause which, in natural or 
probable sequence, produces the injury complained of. It need not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest 
cause, it is sufficient if it concurs with some other cause acting at the same time, which, in combination with 
it, causes the injury." The Court held that in order for an injury to be excluded from coverage under an 
insurance policy, "the injury must have been caused s^olely' by a proximate cause which is excluded under the 
policy. The insurance carrier has the burden of proof as to whether the injury was caused 'solely' by a 
proximate cause which is excluded under the policy." The Court held the verdict supported the conclusion 
that a proximate cause of the child's injuries was a failure to provide sufficient and adequate supervision of 
the children. In addition, the Court held the record in the case did not establish the "sole" proximate cause 
of the child's injuries was the use, operation or maintenance of the station wagon and, therefore, U.S. Fidelity 
& Guaranty Company had not met its burden of proving that the child's injuries were caused "solely" by a 
proximate cause excluded under the policy. 
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the Seventh Circuit held the "negligent supervision" claim is a separately recognized cause 
of action, and it is non-auto related conduct and therefore it is outside the scope of the 
motor-vehicle-exclusion clause* The Court held coverage existed even though "the 
occurrence may have been vehicle related."33 
In TueU v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 132 111. App. 3d 449, 477 N.E. 2d 70 
(1985), the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District dealt with a wrongful-death 
lawsuit which involved a collision between two motorcycles. The Court noted in the Second 
Amended Complaint, there was a count where the parents alleged "negligent supervision" 
of their minor child's operation of a motorcycle and another count raised a claim for 
"negligent entrustment" of a motorcycle. The Court held there was coverage under the 
homeowner's policy even though the occurrence may have been vehicle-related. This 
holding was based on the Court's finding that allegations of negligent "entrustment" and 
those of negligent "supervision" are separately recognized causes of action. 
These same differences and distinctions are also recognized in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (1965) where § 308 deals with a cause of action for "negligent 
entrustment" and § 316 deals with a cause of action for negligent "supervision or control of 
33The Court in West American noted the Illinois decisions in the two US. Fidelity & Guaranty Company 
cases properly distinguished the different elements required to state a "negligent supervision" cause of action 
(such as in COUNTS in the Taylor v. Olsons lawsuit) from a "negligent entrustment" cause of action (such as 
in COUNT 4 of the underlying lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit noted it found no Illinois case regarding a 
negligent "supervision" claim which required the same elements of the "use and operation" of a motor vehicle 
as in a "negligent entrustment" casec In Footnote 1 on page 268 of the Federal Second Reporter, the Seventh 
Circuit noted the two U.S* Fidelity & Guaranty Company cases involved a multi-peril policy for the operation 
of a day-care center^ whereas the case before the Seventh Circuit involved a "homeowner's policy," However, 
the Court noted the vehicle exclusion in each policy was so similar that any difference was insignificant in 
the evaluation of the motor-vehicle-exclusion clause* 
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minor children." This distinction was recognized by the United States Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Douglass v. Hartford Insurance Company, supra.34 
COUNT 5 of Myra L. Taylor's underlying Complaint is based on a § 316 cause of 
action for failure by the parents/Olsons to properly supervise and control the conduct of 
their minor child Heather and it is so identified at the beginning of the Count; whereas, 
COUNT 4 is identified as a "negligent entrustmenf cause of action under § 308 of the 
Restatement Defendant appears to have a "blind spot" with respect to the difference in 
these two Counts and wants to have this Court believe there is no difference, 
notwithstanding the cases of Douglass, supra, and Hinze, supra, and the other cases discussed 
in this POINT 6. 
34Negligent entrustment is common law tort recognized in virtually every state. The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 308 (1965) states the rule as follows: 
It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage in an activity 
which is under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or should know that such person 
intends or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in such a manner as 
to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. 
There is a logical distinction between negligent entrustment, which may apply to any person entrusting 
a potentially dangerous instrumentality to a third person, and the duty of parents to supervise and control their 
children. The Law of Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes the distinction in § 316 as follows: 
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor child as 
to prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an 
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them if the parent 
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the child, and 
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such 
control. 
Colorado has expressly recognized the formulation in § 316. 
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In the instant case, American Fire's Homeowner Policy on page 10 of 15 in 
SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGES, COVERAGE E - Personal Liability reads as 
follows: 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages 
because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to 
which this coverage applies, we will 
1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the 
insured is legally liable; and 
2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice, even 
if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent We may investigate and settle 
any claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our duty to settle or defend 
ends when the amount we pay for damages resulting from the occurrence 
equals our limit of liability. 
With respect to this broad insuring clause, the United States Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Douglass, supra, cited with approval certain language from Upland Mutual 
Insurance, Inc. v. Noel, 214 Kan. 145, 519 P.2d 737 (1974).35 
35The Kansas Supreme Court was presented with an automobile accident and a homeowners' policy 
containing language almost identical to the Policy at issue here. The Noels were sued for the "negligent 
entrustment" of an automobile to their son whose negligence allegedly caused the death of a passenger in the 
can Upland Mutual was requested to defend them under the general liability provisions of their homeowners' 
policy. The company refused, citing an exclusion similar to one of the three exclusions in this case applicable 
to automobiles, to wit: "This policy does not apply:... to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of: (3) any recreational motor vehicle owned 
by any Insured, if the bodily injury or property damage occurs away from the residence premises." The Court 
focused on the language in the insurance policy that Upland promised to pay wall sums which the Insured shall 
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage," and reasoned: 
There is nothing in this broad insuring clause which restricts coverage to accidents 
or injuries occurring on the premises of the homeowner. In fact it is clear that the insuring 
clause covers a wide variety of accidents which might occur off the premises. Any escape 
from liability by Upland Mutual under its policy must be found in the special exclusion* 
519 P.2d at 541 
Since the exclusion only covered "ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of 
. . . automobiles," and the basis of the action was the entrustment of an automobile, the Court held: 
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Finally, and as noted at the beginning of this POINT 6. the Utah Court of Appeals 
in Drysdale v. Rogers, adopted § 316 of the Restatement Torts (Second) stating that ,fa 
parent is under a duly to exercise reasonable care to control his minor child," 
POINT 7 
NONE OF THE THREE EXCLUSIONS IN THE OLSONS' HOMEOWNER'S 
POLICY APPLY TO THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN COUNT 5 OF MYRA L. TAYLOR'S 
UNDERLYING COMPLAINT AGAINST THE OLSONS BECAUSE THE THREE 
EXCLUSIONS DO NOT PURPORT TO ADDRESS THE FACTS IN COUNT 5 OF THE 
UNDERLYING LAWSUIT WHICH ARE NONAUTO-RELATED SUCH AS (1) THE 
PARENTS/OLSONS' FAILURE TO PROPERLY SUPERVISE AND CONTROL THEIR 
MINOR CHILD HEATHER, (2) HEATHER'S CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOLIC 
BEVERAGES RESULTING IN A .14 BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT AT THE TIME OF 
THE ACCIDENT, AND FOR OTHER REASONS MORE FULLY DISCUSSED IN THIS 
BRIEF. 
Notwithstanding the numerous federal and state court decisions holding a 
homeowner's insurance company liable for claims in COUNT 5 of the underlying Taylor v. 
Olsons9 Complaint as more fully discussed in POINT 3, supra, and even though Utah has 
recently adopted and approved § 316 of the Restatement of Torts (Second) in Drysdale v. 
Rogers, 869 R2d 1, (Utah 1994), the defendant still argues throughout its Brief that it is 
somehow insulated against liability because of the three (3) exclusions in its homeowner's 
policy. In support of this position and in POINT I of its Argument in its "Brief of 
Appellant" on pages 16-27, the defendant cites cases allegedly supporting its position. 
The insurance policy before us expressly provides that Upland Mutual is required to 
defend the Noels against an action even if the suit is "groundless" in law or "false and 
fraudulent" in facte... The actual liability of the insured to the claimant is not the criteria 
which places upon the insurance company the obligation to defend. Here Upland Mutual 
had an obligation to defends the Noels against the Forresters' action since the Forresters' 
petition contained allegations which, if sustained, would impose a liability covered by the 
policy. (Numerous citations omitted) [emphasis added] 
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However all of these cases cited by the defendant can be easily distinguished from 
the circumstances in COUNTS of the underlying Taylor v* Olsons lawsuit Nowhere, in any 
of the defendant's cases, are there any circumstances mentioned in the opinions which 
would trigger § 316 of the Restatement of Torts (Second). None of those cases involve 
prior incidents of misconduct by the minor children. For all that appears in the opinions, 
the alleged misconduct was a first-time incident, and the parents had no prior knowledge 
of the minor's misconduct The defendant attempts to side-step this issue and difference 
by citing cases dealing with "negligent entrustment" characterized in COUNT 4 of the 
underlying Complaint; which the courts readily recognize requires different elements than 
a cause of action based upon § 316 of the Restatement of Torts.36 
36This difference is described more fully by the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Douglass 
Ve Hartford Ins. Co*9 supra. Senteney by Senteney v. Fire Insurance Exchange? 101 Nev. 654,707 P.2d 1149 (1985), 
cited and discussed by the defendant on pages 17-18 of its Brief, is a "negligent entrustment" case., Nothing 
is said about "failure to supervise and control* the conduct of another person. Furthermore, nothing is said 
about the motorcycle driver being a minor0 In Scopenote [5] the Senteney court recognized circumstances 
could occur that would permit coverage by both the automobile liability policy as well as the homeowner's 
policy., The court said that in order for such "double coverage" to exist, there would have to be a non-vehicle 
related cause and that cause must be separate and distinct from the vehicle., As pointed out in all of the cases 
discussed in POINT 3, supra, the courts consistently held the allegations in Count 5 of Ms. Taylor's Complaint 
were "separate and distinct" from the allegations in Counts 1 and 4 similar to those dealing with the use of 
the vehicle and with negligent entrustment. And as noted by the United States Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Worthington, supra, Utah law looks to the cause of action pleaded in the particular counts in the 
complaint, rather than to the underlying instrumentality which caused the accident. 
Similarly, Safeco Insurance Company v. Gilstrap, 141 CaL App. 3rd 524,190 Cal. Rptr. 425 (App, 1983), 
cited and discussed by the defendant on pages 18-19 of its Brief involves only "negligent entrustment," and 
does not involve a "failure to properly supervise and control the conduct of a minor child" such as in Count 
5 of the Taylor v. Olsons underlying Complaint. Moreover, there are no facts showing the parents knew the 
minor child had previously taken the motorcycle or that they had in any way tried to stop him from prior use 
of the motorcycle. Furthermore, there are no facts spoken of in the opinion dealing with the minor child ever 
having taken the motorcycle from the garage previously either with or without his parents' consent. Safeco 
interpreted the leading California case of Partridge, supra, (which, again, the defendant has not referred this 
court to anywhere in its Brief) as holding that "a victim may recover if the accident arose (1) from a cause not 
involving the use of the vehicle, or (2) from a cause concurrent with any cause arising from the use of the 
vehiclec" 
Likewise, the case of Hawaiian Insurance & Guaranty Co. v. Chief Clerk, 713 P.2d 427 (Haw. 1986), 
was a simple "negligent entrustment" case similar to the allegations in Count 4 of Ms. Taylor's underlying 
Complaint. However, there is nothing in the case discussing the allegations in Count 5 dealing with the 
parents' failure to supervise and control the conduct of their minor child. The court recognized § 308 of the 
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With respect to the cases cited by the defendant which discuss the issue of "failure 
to supervise and control the activities of a minor child," and in addition to the already 
mentioned substantial difference that none of these cases recite any factual circumstances 
showing prior notice by the parents of any misconduct on the part of the child, there are 
also many other reasons why these cases either do not apply to the issues in COUNT 5 or 
are actually support for the cause of action stated in COUNT 5.37 
Restatement of Torts (Second) involves "negligent entrustment" which implies "permission," "consent," or 
"voluntary relinquishment of possession" by the parents to the minor child. None of these circumstances exist 
in the instant case where Heather's taking the car was contrary to specific instruction of the parents as the 
defendant acknowledges at page 8 of its Brief. 
Finally, it is unclear why the defendant cited Indiana Insurance Co. v. Winston, 377 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 
App, 1980) on page 23 of its Brief, since that case does not involve either a "negligent entrustment" claim 
under Count 4 of the underlying Complaint, or a "failure to properly supervise and control the activities of 
a minor child" under Count 5 of the Complaint. The case involves an automobile on the insured's property 
which was being remodeled and undergoing some external and mechanical modifications including the 
modification of the hood to accommodate the installation of an air scoop. 
For example, one of the leading cases relied on by the defendant is Lahey v. Benjou, 759 P.2d 855 (Colo. 
App. 1988). In this case the parents' homeowner's insurer intervened. In Scopenote [3] the court noted, 
"there is an overlap between negligent entrustment and negligent supervision in the parent-child relationship. 
See Douglass v. Hartford Insurance Co., 602 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1979); Restatement (2d) of Torts, §§ 308 and 
316 (1965). . ." The Douglass is discussed in detail at POINT 6, supra, and is good authority for the 
proposition that a cause of action for a § 308 Restatement violation for "negligent entrustment" in COUNT 
4 of the underlying Complaint is quite different from a § 316 cause of action for "failure to adequately 
supervise and control the conduct of a minor child" in COUNTS. 
Another case relied upon by the defendant, but which actually supports the plaintiffs position with 
respect to COUNTS of the underlying Complaint is Allstate Insurance Company v. Pruittby Pruitt, 111 111. App. 
3rd 407, 532 N.E. 2d 401 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1988). The Pruitt court recognized § 316 of the Restatement of 
Torts is an expansion of parental liability. 
Moreover, the general rule in Illinois has long been that parents are not liable for 
the torts of their children merely because of the parent-child relationship, [citations omitted] 
An exception to the general rules proposed in section 316 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts as an expansion of parental liability* 
* * • 
Thus, under section 316, a parent can be held liable only if the complaint alleges 
specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put the parent on notice that the act 
complained of was likely to occur [citation omitted] and that the parent had the ability to 
control the child [citation omitted]. 
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In Farmers Insurance Group of Oregon v. Nelsen, 79 Or. App. 213, 715 P.2d 492 (Or. 
App. 1986), cited by defendant on page 23 of its Brief, the court decided the case on the 
exclusion which provided a definition for "motor vehicle" which included a "motorized land 
vehicle owned by any insured and designed for recreational use off public roads, while off 
an insured location." The court adopted the "instrumentality" theory, which unlike the law 
in Utah, as stated by the Tenth Circuit in Worthington, supra, does not recognize the various 
theories of liability in the different counts of a complaint. The Nelsen court did 
acknowledge there were several states which reached different results and which held 
theories of negligent entrustment and negligent supervision do not relate to the ownership, 
operation or use of a motor vehicle in a direct sense so as to exclude claims from coverage 
under a motor vehicle exclusion.38 
Although we know of no Illinois case expressly adopting section 316, the Complaint 
at issue here alleges only that Pruitt, Sr. negligently failed to control and supervise the 
conduct of his son. It is devoid of any factual allegations that Pruitt, Sr. had the ability to 
do so or that he had or should have had knowledge that there was a necessity to exercise 
such control. Therefore* on the basis of the record before us, we do not believe that section 
316, even if followed in this State, would be applicable to the instant case to impose a duty 
upon which liability could be predicted." [emphasis added] 
It is abundantly clear, the Pruitt court recognized § 316 of the Restatement would be support for the 
allegations of failure to properly supervise and control the conduct of the minor child, and this Section 
expands parental liability. The Pruitt court also recognized the complaint in the case was devoid of any factual 
allegations to support a § 316 claim, but had there been such adequate, factual allegations, it is clear a § 316 
cause of action would have been recognized. 
Contrary to the complaint in Pruitt, COUNT 5 in the instant case supplies all of the factual 
circumstances and allegations which were missing in Pruitt. See COUNT 5 in the Taylor Complaint which not 
only incorporates the preceding four (4) Counts but adds numerous additional facts showing a § 316 cause 
of action. As pointed out in POINT 6, supra, Utah has adopted § 316 of the Restatement in the recent case 
of Drysdak v. Rogers, supra. In Pruitt, the court found the homeowner's policy did not apply because the 
accident occurred on public property, and there was a specific provision that the coverage extended only to 
damages on land which was the residence premises. 
^The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held a split of authority among the courts when interpreting 
exclusionary language in an insurance policy is sufficient by itself to create an ambiguity in the language and 
to defeat the alleged exclusion See Wolf v. Prudential Insurance Company, 50 F.3d 793 (10th Or. 1995) at 
footnote 11 on p. 800 where the court said there had been twenty-four published Federal cases construing an 
exclusion and "this amount of litigation reveals the uncertainty caused by undefined experimental procedure 
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Other cases cited by Defendant can also be easily distinguished. 
In Daus v. Marble, 270 NX Super. 241, 636 A.2d 1091 (1994), cited on page 24 of 
Defendant's Brief, the court evaluated the case on different legal theories such as giving 
liquor to minors and the social-host doctrine, etc. This position taken by the New Jersey 
Appellate Court is contrary to other cases which American Fire has cited holding legal 
exclusions for insurance consumers and litigants alike." Similarly the number of cases cited by Defendant, 
even if they had involved factual circumstances like those found in Count 5 in the underlying lawsuit, would 
only produce a split of authority and thus an ambiguity when compared to all the cases discussed by the 
plaintiffs in POINT 6. supra, holding Count 5 is not covered by the exclusions in American Fire's homeowner's 
policy. This "ambiguity" issue is more fully discussed in POINTS, infra. 
In Citizens Security Mutual Insumme Co. v. Levinson, 445 N.W. 2d 585 (Minn. App. 1989) cited on page 
23 of Defendant's Brief, the homeowner's insurer brought a declaratory judgment action seeking the extent 
of coverage for injuries suffered by insureds' daughter as she was alighting from a vehicle. The parent was 
driving a GMC Suburban and he was accompanied by his son Brent in the middle seat and his daughter 
Megan in the third seat. He parked the vehicle across the street from his friend's house and he and Brent 
exited the Suburban leaving Megan, who was apparently asleep in the back seat. They crossed the street. As 
they approached the sidewalk to the friend's house, they heard a screeching of brakes. They turned and saw 
Megan lying in the street near a car driven by another motorist. Again, this case does not present any factual 
circumstances remotely similar to those in the instant case, and is not authority against the position taken by 
the plaintiffs in COUNTS of their Complaint 
In Levinson, the Minneapolis Court of Appeals cited another case, to wit, Waseca Mutual Insurance 
Company v. Noska, 331 N.W. 2d 917 (Minn. 1983), which actually supports the plaintiff s position in COUNT 
5 of the Complaint. In Noska, the insured drove to his home and shoveled ashes into two (2) steel barrels 
containing burnt material. These barrels were loaded onto a trailer and were towed by a truck to a nearby 
landfill. Along the way, sparks flew from the barrels causing massive fire damage. The Supreme Court of 
Minnesota concluded that the insured's negligence was divided into two independent concurrent causes, one 
nonvehicular (shoveling ashes into barrels at the insured's home) and the other vehicular (sparks flew from 
barrels as they were being towed on a trailer by the truck). The Supreme court held the homeowner insurer 
could not deny coverage based on a policy exclusion for claims arising out of the use, maintenance, operating, 
loading and unloading of a motor vehicle., 
Similarly, in the instant case the allegations in COUNTS, which include repeated prior abuses by the 
minor child Heather in both drinking, attending parties where alcoholic beverages were consumed, and driving 
the Volkswagen, which was not roadworthy, was not licensed, was not insured, and was not registered, and 
attending a party resulting in a .14 blood alcohol content at the time of the accident are all non-vehicular facts 
supporting the cause of action in COUNTS. 
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theories are not important, rather a court should look at the underlying occurrence or 
instrumentality which caused the accident40 
^Xn Phillips F. Estate of Greenfield, 859 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1993) cited by Defendant on page 21 of its Brief, 
the Court acknowledged different legal theories and elements between the cause of action for "negligent 
entrustment" and for "failure to supervise," but it also said the homeowner's policy did not insure against legal 
"theories" of liability but only "occurrences" or accidents away from the insured premises. Likewise, 
Defendant's case of Farmers Insurance Group of Oregon v. Nelsen, supra, decided the case on the defense of 
the "instrumentality" causing the accident, rather than the "legal theories" involvedc However, Defendant's 
cases of Daus v. Marble, supra, and Allstate Insurance Company v. Pruitt by Pruitt, supra, reached their results 
based on different "legal theories" involved in the action, and these two courts say nothing about the 
"occurrences" or "accidents." 
As discussed in POINT 6, supra, Worthington interpreted Utah law to be among those courts which 
look to the "legal theories" pleaded in the Complaint and not to the underlying instrumentality. This would 
seem to make much more sense, since every case is going to involve a motor vehicle, regardless of the legal 
theory involved. To find all exclusions binding based on the "instrumentality" concept is patently unfair to 
those plaintiffs whose causes of action derive from a § 316 set of factse Virtually all of the cases cited by the 
Defendant recognize there are certain circumstances where there could be both vehicle-relatedcauses of action 
and nonvehicle-related causes of action. However, if the instrumentality theory were to prevail, none of those 
cases would be able to make that claim, since in every one of them the instrumentality or the underlying motor 
vehicle causing the accident would have been excluded. Finally, by citing cases a using different methodology 
to reach the final result, the Defendant has established a split of authority which the Tenth Circuit held in 
Wolf, supra, was sufficient by itself to establish an ambiguity! 
The Daus court cited with approval another New Jersey case, to wit, Salem Group v. Oliver, 248 NJ. 
Super. 265, 271, 590 A.2d 1194 (App. Div. 1991), where the court held a homeowner's policy applied when 
an insured provided both alcoholic beverages and an all-terrain vehicle to his minor nephew. The 
homeowner's insurance company argued an exclusion similar to the one in Daus precluded the lawsuit. The 
Law Judge denied the insurer's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Appellate Court affirmed. The insurer 
appealed to the Supreme Court which affirmed the trial judge's denial of summary judgment. The Supreme 
Court made it clear the question of coverage for the insured turned on the peculiar facts of the case and the 
nature of the coverage afforded the insured. The Supreme Court said, "The Fifth Count of the complaint 
clearly alleged social host liability against the insured for supplying alcoholic beverages to Oliver." With 
respect to that Count and the homeowner's policy, the court observed: 
No one disputes that insurers are generally obligated to defend their insureds on 
social host claims. The critical question is whether the insurer can avoid that obligation 
because a separate excluded risk, the operation of an all-terrain vehicle (ATV), constitutes 
an additional cause of the injury. We find that the insurer remains obligated to defend the 
covered risk. It may not avoid that obligation simply because the operation of an ATV 
constitutes an additional cause of the injury, [emphasis added] 
In Gorzen v. Westfield Insurance Company, 207 Mich. App. 575, 526 N.W. 2d 43 (Mich. App. 1994), 
cited by American Fire on page 22 of its Brief, the court construed a Michigan statute § 600.2913 which made 
the parents liable for the willful or malicious manner in which a minor operated a motor vehicle. The case 
did not discuss any facts in which the parents were alleged to be negligent in their control or supervision of 
their minor son, therefore it is unknown if the fact situation is similar to the instant case. There are certainly 
no allegations of repeated past offenses by the minor, no allegations the minor had repeatedly taken the car 
and was using alcoholic beverage and the parents knew of these prior instances of misconduct, etc. such as 
are found in COUNTS of Ms. Taylor's Complaint. The Michigan Court adopted the "instrumentality" rule 
and held the particular theory of liability alleged in the various counts of the complaint was not important. 
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From all of these cases cited by the defendant in POINT 1 of its Brief, there are no 
allegations of prior misconduct on the part of the minor child nor any recognition the 
parents had prior knowledge of any of their child's dangerous propensities. Under these 
circumstances it is clear § 316 of the Restatement, which applies to COUNT 5 of Ms. 
Taylor's underlying Complaint, would not be triggered and there would be no basis to find 
liability under the cause of action in COUNT 5. to wit, the parents' failure to adequately 
supervise and control the activities of their sixteen-year-old minor child Jennifer Heather 
Olson. 
Finally, all the cases which Defendant's counsel Jill M. Aggeler cites in POINT I of 
Defendant's Brief dealing with failure of the Olsons/Parents to supervise and control the 
activity of their sixteen-year-old daughter Jennifer Heather are submitted for the first time 
As noted above, and as the Tenth Circuit stated in the Worthington case, supra, Utah law recognizes and uses 
the theory of liability alleged in the various claims in the complaint, and does not look to the underlying 
instrumentality or occurrence. 
In National American Insurance Co. v. Coburn, 209 Cal. App. 3d 914, 257 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1989), 
discussed on pages 19-20 of the Defendant's Brief, the insurer brought action for declaratory relief that it had 
no duty to defend or indemnify insureds with respect to any damages arising from an underlying wrongful 
death and negligent action brought by the parents of a child who was killed when the insureds' van rolled over 
him. The court referred to the California case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Partridge, supra, 
and because of the particular factual circumstances in Coburn, found the homeowner's insurance policy did 
not cover the wrongful death and negligent action. The case involved the question of whether the policy 
exclusions relating to motor vehicle use in loading applied when the insureds left their van parked in their 
driveway with its doors open and its parking brake not set while loading the van for a camping trip, with the 
result that one small child moved the shift lever from a "park position," putting the van in motion would apply. 
Again, this case does not have any moving accident and there are certainly no allegations of any intoxication, 
prior offenses, knowledge on the part of the parents, etc. pertaining to the Coburn's children two-and-one-half-
year-old twins and a three-and-one-half-year-old who were playing with another parent's three-year-old sons. 
The opinion does not identify which of these three-year-old children moved the shift lever in the van from a 
"park position" causing it to roll backward down the incline of the driveway, so there was no basis to hold any 
parent liable. 
The Coburn court, in discussing the Partridge decision, noted the Partridge court approved a Georgia 
Appellate case in similar fact situations reaching a different result because the parents were not present at the 
time of the minor's negligent acts and therefore the parents did not give their consent or entrustment nor did 
they participate to the extent they did in Partridge. See Assurance Company of America v. Bell, 108 Ga. App. 
766, 134 S.E. 2d 540 (1963). Similarly, in the instant case, the parents Olsons were not present at the time 
of the accident involving Jennifer Heather Olson, their sixteen-year-old minor daughter, and Ms. Taylor. 
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on appeal.41 At the hearing on May 24, 1995, dealing with both parties' Motions for 
Summary Judgment, Judge Frank Gc Noel asked Ms* Aggeler if she had any cases holding 
American Fire's exclusions applied to the situation described in COUNTS in the underlying 
Complaint Defendant's counsel admitted she did not have any such cases and 
acknowledged all her citations dealt with the exclusions in the homeowner's policy in the 
context of claims for (1) use and operation of a motor vehicle as alleged in COUNT 1 of 
Ms. Taylor's Complaint, or (2) negligent entrustment as alleged in COUNT 4. 
POINT 8 
THE ATTEMPTED EXCLUSION OF STATUTORILY IMPOSED VICARIOUS 
PARENTAL LIABILITY OF THE PARENT, RONALD H. OLSON, FOR THE ACTIONS 
OF HIS MINOR CHILD, JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON, IS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC 
POLICY AND IS THEREFORE VOID, BECAUSE §§ 41-2-115 AND 41-2-116 OF THE 
UTAH CODE REQUIRE PARENTS TO BE LIABLE FOR TORTS COMMITTED BY 
THEIR MINOR CHILDREN, 
In its Brief the Defendant cites an alleged exclusion for "statutorily imposed vicarious 
parental liability for the actions of a child or minor" using a vehicle excluded in other 
provisions on page 11 of the Policy. See Brief of Appellant, p. 17. The Defendant argues 
this exclusion defeats the clear liability existent under former § 41-2-115, Utah Code 
41See the following Memoranda filed by Ms. Aggeler in Judge Noel's Court, none of which cite or discuss 
any cases with facts or claims relating to a Restatement 316 situation. 
(1) Defendant's "Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment" dated October 5, 
1994, found at R. 619-696. 
(2) Defendant's "Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment" dated 
January 5, 1995, found at R. 902-920. 
(3) Defendant's "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" 
regarding insurance company liability dated February 21,1995, found at Rc 1138-1181. 
The Plaintiffs object to those citations in Point I of Defendant's Brief which are being used for the 
first time in this appeal and hereby request this Court to disregard all of the said cases in reaching its decision. 
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Annotated, 1953, as amended, which imposes vicarious parental liability for the acts of a 
minor-motor-vehicle operator upon those persons who sign the application of the minor for 
a permit or a license, which in the instant case would be Heather's father, Ronald H. Olson. 
The Defendant did not make this same argument with respect to parental liability pursuant 
to § 41-2-116, in the trial court, however, for the purposes of this Appeal only, the Plaintiffs 
will assume this was an oversight on the part of the Defendant and will consider both 
sections in this POINT 8. 
Since the Utah Legislature has made it clear in §§ 41-2-115(2) and 41-2-116, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,42 that Ronald H. Olson would be liable for the 
negligent misconduct of his 16-year-old minor child, Jennifer Heather Olson, when 
operating a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state, any attempted exclusions by the 
Defendant in its Policy would be void as against public policy. In this regard, see Farmers 
Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985).43 
provisions of former Sections 41-2-115 and 41-2-116 are presently codified in Utah Code Annotated, 
Sections 53-3-211 and 53-3-212. 
In Farmers Insurance Exchange, the Utah Supreme Court held that a household or family exclusion 
provision in an automobile insurance policy contravened the statutory requirements found in Utah's No-Fault 
Insurance Act [§§ 31-41-1 to 13, Utah Code Annotated (1974, Supp. 1985)] as to minimum benefits which 
must be provided to all persons sustaining personal injury. This holding represents a statement by the Utah 
Supreme Court that exclusionary provisions in insurance policies are void and against public policy to the 
extent the provisions contravene statutory requirements and legislative expressions. 
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs have alleged the statutory vicarious liability of the parent Ronald H. 
Olson for Jennifer Olson's misconduct in COUNT 3 of the Complaint. The Utah Legislature has held a parent 
must be responsible for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle whenever that parent (1) signs the minor's 
application for a driver's license, as Ronald H. Olson did in the instant case, and (2) whenever the parent 
"gives or furnishes a motor vehicle to the minor" as the Court found Ronald H. Olson did in the instant case 
with respect to his Volkswagen which his minor daughter was driving at the time she collided with the vehicle 
driven by Myra L. Taylor. 
The Defendant's attempt to contravene and eliminate these plain statutory provisions, is as much 
against public policy as was Farmers Insurance Exchange's attempt to eliminate the requirements found in 
Utah's No-Fault Insurance Act when it put its household or family exclusion provision in its insurance policy. 
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POINT 9 
THE DEFENDANT IS BOUND BY JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON'S FINDINGS 
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT IN THE UNDERLYING 
TAYLOR/OLSONS' LAWSUIT AND CANNOT MAKE A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON 
THOSE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND JUDGMENT IN THIS INSTANT LAWSUIT 
BECAUSE THE HOMEOWNERS' POLICY REQUIRED AMERICAN FIRE TO DEFEND 
THE OLSONS, AMERICAN FIRE RECEIVED NOTICE OF THE MYRA L. TAYLOR 
LAWSUIT AGAINST THE OLSONS AND WAS ALLOWED AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
DEFEND BUT REFUSED TO DO SO. 
In Point II on pp. 27-33 of its Brief, the Defendant argues it is not bound by any of 
Judge Hanson's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law or Judgement in the underlying 
Taylor/Olsons' Lawsuit In essence the Defendant is asking this Court to relitigate the 
Taylor v. Olsons lawsuit! The Defendant cites McCarty v. Parks, 564 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977), 
as authority for its position. 
The Defendant distorts the holding in the Utah Supreme Court case of McCarty v. 
Parks, supra, by alleging McCarty was authority for the proposition the Defendant is not 
bound by Judge Hanson's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in the 
underlying action. See "Brief of Appellant," p. 30. McCarty does not hold any such thing!44 
44The Defendant admits the general principle of law cited in McCarty ("when an insurer, whose policy 
requires it to defend its insured, receives notice of a suit against him and is allowed an opportunity to defend, 
but refuses it, is bound by the findings and judgment therein"). However American Fire argues there is a well-
recognized exception stating the general law wdoes not extend to matters collateral or immaterial to the 
essential issues involved in the case, but is limited to those necessary to determination of the controversy 
between the immediate parties." [emphasis added] 
After stating this exception, the Defendant then fails to apply any of the exception language to the 
facts in the instant case. Rather, it jumps to a conclusion that it is not bound by collateral recitals in the 
Finding, without any discussion whatsoever as to whether any of Judge Hanson's Findings, Conclusions, and 
Judgment are "collateral" or "immaterial" to the issues in the underlying lawsuit. Moreover, the Defendant 
does not define the terms "collateral" or "immateriafnor does it point to any of Judge Hanson's findings which 
fit into this category. This is defective syllogistic reasoning since there is no attempt to apply the "exception" 
to any of Judge Hanson's Findings. Without discussing these Findings and why they do not relate to the issues 
in the Taylor/Olsons Lawsuit, the Defendant has absolutely no basis whatsoever for its conclusion the 
"exception" somehow magically applies to the issues now before this Court Nor does the Defendant discuss 
the substantial factual and legal differences between McCarty and the instant casee 
In McCarty, the Court determined the issue in the underlying lawsuit was one of negligence between 
a single plaintiffydriver and a single defendant/driver, There was no issue of third-party liability which is the 
crux of the case against the Olsons/parents in the underlying Taylor/Olsons Lawsuit. The Court in McCarty 
noted the issue in the underlying lawsuit was not the same issue to be determined with respect to the plaintiffs 
claim against the insurance company in a post-judgment garnishment proceedings. The Court said before the 
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insurance company could be held liable under the language in its policy, there had to be a finding the 
defendant was using the automobile with the approval of the owners or policyholders. The Court held that 
issue was not necessary to the judgment in the underlying action which dealt solely with whether the defendant 
was negligent in causing damage to the plaintiff and the amount thereof. The Court said "since the issue as 
to whether Mr. Parks was driving with the permission of the insured was not a material issue in the main case 
the recital thereon in the findings was not res judicata as to the garnishee defendant, Royal Globe, who was 
not a party to that action;..." The Court also found the plaintiff was not entitled to sue the insurance 
company, because he was not an insured. 
In McCarty, the Court clearly said the "exception" does not allow an insurance company to attack 
"findings on material issues which were determined" by the parties in the underlying action. See McCarty, 564 
P.2d at p. 1123 [1,2]. Again, the Defendant does not discuss why any of Judge Hanson's Findings were not 
material or essential to the issues in the Taylor/Olsons' Lawsuit. The Plaintiffs submit all of the Findings 
relate to the issues in the five Counts of the Complaint in the Taylor/Olsons' action and the Defendant has 
clearly not met its burden of proving why those findings, or any of them, were not essential and material to 
the issues in the Taylor/Olsons Lawsuit. 
Paragraph 23 of the Findings establishes the liability of both Olson parents for the damages sought 
by Myra L. Taylor and further says clearly the parents' failure to adequately supervise and control the conduct 
of their minor child was the sole proximate cause of the injuries Ms. Taylor sustained. Other findings also bear 
on this issue. See, paragraphs 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40 of said Findings in Exhibit 
"4" attached hereto. These findings were essential and critical to establish liability on the part of the 
Olsons/parents. None of the other Counts in the Complaint alleged a cause of action against Carol D. Olson, 
the mother of Jennifer Heather Olson. Clearly the Finding in paragraph 23, as well as the other findings, is 
not subject to collateral attack in the instant action. The Defendant had every opportunity to get involved in 
the Taylor/Olsons Lawsuit but failed, refused, and neglected to do so each time its help was requested by the 
Olsons. Under these circumstances, the Defendant cannot now subject the parties to a second lawsuit to 
decide the very same issues which Judge Hanson has already decided 
In McCarty, the Court cited the general principle of law which states an insurance company is bound 
by the findings, conclusions, and judgment in the underlying action when the policy requires it to defend its 
insured, when it receives notice of the suit against it, and is allowed an opportunity to defend, but refuses to 
do so. In support of this general principle of law, the Court cited with approval the Arizona Supreme Court, 
In Banc., case of Dairyland Insurance Company v. Richards, 108 Ariz. 89, 492 P.2d 1196 (1972). In its Brief 
the Defendant failed to apprise this Court of the fact the Dairyland case reached a totally different result from 
that in McCarty under factual circumstances which are virtually identical to those existing in the instant case. 
In Dairyland, the plaintiff victim/driver of an automobile brought an action against the sole driver of 
a second automobile. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged the defendant "at all material times was acting 
as agent of or by consent of Raymond Sherfield and Eula Sherfield, the owners of the automobile driven by 
O'field." The defendants were duly and regularly served with process but did not answer within the time 
permitted by law and a default judgment was entered against them. Prior to the entry of the default judgment 
and before the time to answer had expired, the defendant took the complaint with which he had been served 
to the local office of Dairyland Insurance Company. He was advised, similarly as the Olsons were advised by 
American Fire in the instant case, that his policy did not cover the accident for the reason that he owned the 
vehicle involved in the collision and therefore a policy exclusion applied. In the instant case, this is the 
identical position taken by American Fire, to wit, that the Olsons' homeowners' policy did not cover the 
accident for the reason that the policy excluded any occurrences caused by the use, operation, maintenance, 
entrustment, etc. of a motor vehicle. 
In Dairyland, the plaintiff commenced garnishment proceedings against the insurance company and 
a second trial was held with respect to the issue of whether the owners of the automobile were liable for the 
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The Plaintiffs submit the Dairyland case is identical to the factual circumstances in 
the instant case and should be followed by this Court The Utah Supreme Court in 
McCarty, supra, recognized and approved the general principle of law enunciated in 
Dairyland. See, McCarty, 564 P.2d at 1123, footnote 1. The Utah Supreme Court also cited, 
negligence of the driver. Evidence was introduced in this second trial demonstrating the prior owners had 
actually sold the motor vehicle to the defendant, had been paid in full, and had signed a title in blank before 
a notary public and delivered the title and vehicle to the defendant. This "uncontradicted" evidence, therefore, 
conclusively established, according to the insurer, that the defendant owned the vehicle which allegedly hit the 
plaintiffs vehicle. Under these circumstances, the insurance company argued it was not liable for the 
occurrence because the policy specifically excluded any vehicles "owned" by the defendant. 
With respect to this argument, which is virtually identical to the argument made by American Fire 
in the instant case in its own Motion for Summary Judgment, the Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc., held 
the insurance company was precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel from attacking 
the findings in the former trial. In doing so, the Court adopted the general principles of law which have been 
recognized and approved by nearly every state in this country including Utah. 
[1] We think, however, that notwithstanding the testimony introduced in the 
garnishment proceedings, the judgment against OTield [defendant] obtained by the 
Richardses was res judicata and could not be subsequently impeached. Judgments and actions 
against insureds have been held conclusive in a variety of circumstances, [citing numerous 
cases from the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, California, Georgia, New York, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Texas]. 
The facts of the Richards case [the underlying or first action] were determined to be 
that OTield was acting as agent of or by consent of the Sherfields. The issue became res 
judicata by the entry of the judgment below. The court below did not error in concluding that 
Dairyland could not claim the vehicle which defendant OTield acquired from defendant 
Sherfield was owned by the defendant OTield. 
We must presume the court in the Richardses' suit found that the allegations of the 
complaint were supported by the evidence. THE JUDGMENT ENTERED, ALTHOUGH BY 
DEFAULT, IS CONCLUSIVE AND RES JUDICATA ON ALL ISSUES WHICH WERE OR 
COULD HAVE BEEN LITIGATED AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL 
IMPEACHMENT AT A SUBSEQUENT TIME, [citations omitted] Dairyland's rights are 
derivative and it is precluded by judgment from later questioning the ownership of the vehicle 
OTield was operating, [emphasis added] 
Similarly, in the instant case Judge Hanson's Finding No. 23 establishing liability on the part of the 
"Olson" parents is conclusive and res judicata on not only that issue but "all issues which were or could have 
been litigated and is not subject to collateral impeachment at a subsequent time.w The issue in the underlying 
Dairyland case dealt with whether absentee owners of a motor vehicle could be held Uable for the negligence 
of a driver of that vehicle. The Court held they could and the Court in the second trial held that former 
finding could not be attacked even though the evidence at the second trial dictated a different finding than 
in the first trial This issue of liability on the part of the absentee owner was not involved in McCarty so a 
different result was reached. However, the issues in the instant Taylor/Olsons case are identical to the issues 
in Dairyland, not McCarty, to wit, whether the absentee Olsons/parents are liable for the negligence of their 
daughter driving a motor vehicle owned by the minor's father. There was no such issue of third-party liability 
in the underlying first trial in McCarty. 
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in footnote 3, the Arizona Appellate Court case of Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. 
ViUasenor, 21 Ariz. App. 206, 517 P.2d 1099 (1974), which likewise holds both the insured 
as well as the insurer is estopped from questioning the findings, conclusions, and judgment 
in a prior case. 
POINT 10 
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES FOR 
LEGAL SERVICES RENDERED ON THIS APPEAL BECAUSE (1) THE SAID SERVICES 
WERE NECESSARY TO AFFIRM JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL'S GRANTING OF PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFFS, (2) JUDGE NOEL AWARDED THE 
PLAINTIFFS A REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES IN THE UNDERLYING TAYLOR v. 
OLSONS LAWSUIT AND DEFENDANT HAS NOT DISCUSSED THOSE FEES 
ANYWHERE IN ITS BRIEF, (3) THE HOMEOWNER'S POLICY SAYS THE 
DEFENDANT WOULD PROVIDE A LEGAL DEFENSE TO ITS INSUREDS, THE 
OLSONS, BUT IT FAILED, REFUSED, AND NEGLECTED TO PROVIDE THE SAID 
DEFENSE, AND (4) RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
SUPPORTS AN AWARD OF FEES UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE. 
The homeowner's policy obligates the insurer to "provide a defense at our expense 
by counsel of our choice, even if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent45 
Exhibit "7" (R. 90 - 126) attached to the Complaint in the Frank G. Noel Court 
shows the repeated requests by Olsons' counsel to have American Fire and Casualty 
Company undertake the defense of the Olsons in the underlying lawsuit commenced by 
Myra L. Taylor. The insurer repeatedly refused to do so, even though it had no basis for 
that refusal, as demonstrated in the preceding nine (9) POINTS in this Brief. 
When the Defendant failed to provide a defense in the underlying lawsuit as well as 
failing to settle, courts generally allow recovery in the excess liability action for attorney fees 
expended by the insured in defending the third-party suit46 Usually, the insured will incur 
45See SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGES, COVERAGE E - Personal Liability at paragraph 2 on 
page 10 of 15 of the said Policy, which is included in the Plaintiffs' Addendum and is also found at R. 23 - 47. 
^See Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335,313 P.2d 404 (1957); Maryland Casualty Co. 
v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616,620 (8th Cir. 1934); Christian v. Preferred Accident Insurance Co., 89 Fed. Supp. 
881,891 (N.D. Cal. 1950); Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ueding, 175 Ind. App. 60,370 N.E. 2d 333,337 (1977); U.S. 
Fid. & Guarantee Co. v. Copfer, 48 N.Y. 2d 871,424 N.Y.S. 2d 356,357,400 N.E. 2d 298-299 (1978). See also 
7 Appleman INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4691 at 239-240 (1979), and cases cited therein. 
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attorney fees either because the insurer refused to provide a defense in a third-party suit 
or if the insured engages a personal attorney to advise him or her and to cooperate with the 
insureds counsel in defense of the third-party suit47 
Because the insurer failed to meet its contractual obligations to provide counsel for 
the Olsons, Judge Noel granted the Plaintiffs a reasonable attorney fees for services 
rendered by their attorney Michael N. Martinez, Esq. in the underlying lawsuit These 
attorney fees were set at $8,345e00o48 
Since the Olsons have a basis for claimed attorney fees in the underlying lawsuit, the 
general rule of law is that the party entitled to attorney fees in the trial court is also entitled 
to attorney fees if that party is successful in the appeal and accordingly this Court of Appeal 
should award Plaintiffs fees on appeal and instruct the trial judge to determine the amount 
of said fees.49 
47See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616, 620 (8th Cir. 1934) and U.S. Fid. and Guar. 
Co. v. Louis A* Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 1978) (Applying Utah law; additional counsel was 
retained because of insurer's conflicting interest in arguing against policy coverage.) 
See the Court's Order granting Summary Judgment with respect to the insurance policy liability at R. 
1494 -1501. Mr. Martinez5 fees are discussed in paragraph 7. A copy of said Summary Judgment is included 
in Plaintiffs Addendum. The Defendant American Fire does not discuss the award of attorney fees to Mr. 
Martinez anywhere in its "Brief of Appellant" Accordingly, this Court may assume the Defendant has no 
objection to the award of the said fees or the amount involved. Admittedly, the Defendant did appeal those 
provisions in Judge Noel's Summary Judgment pertaining to attorney fees, however the only basis for the 
objection insofar as the "Brief of Appellant" is concerned is based on Defendant's belief that the three (3) 
exclusions in its Policy remove any obligation on the part of the insurer to either defend the Olsons in the 
underlying lawsuit or to pay Mr. Martinez' attorney fees for doing so. Under these circumstances, and in the 
event this Court agrees with the position of the Plaintiffs taken in this appeal, and affirms Judge Noel's 
granting of Partial Summary Judgment, then the said attorney fees would also be affirmed. 
4ySee Wade v. Stangl, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 869 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct App. 1994); citing Brown v. Richards, 
840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993) ("A party who was awarded 
attorney fees and costs at trial is also entitled to attorney fees and costs if that party prevails on appeal") 
Accord: HOI v. Hill, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 16,869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); James Constructors v. Salt Lake 
City Corporation, 254 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 888 P.2d 665 (Utah Ct App. 1994); Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 236 
Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 872 P.2d 1057 (Utah Ct App. 1994); and American Vending Services v. Morse, 246 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 29, 881 P.2d 917 (Utah Ct App. 1994). 
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In addition to the reasons discussed above with respect to attorney fees, the Plaintiffs 
are also entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.50 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is virtually identical to its Utah 
counterpart In 95 A.L.R. Fed 107, entitled "COMMENT NOTE - GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES REGARDING IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 11, FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE/1 the author notes in § 6 [a] on pp. 120, et seq. of the 
annotation that Rule 11 "mandates that the conduct of a person who signs a motion, 
pleading, or other paper is to be judged by an objective standard of reasonableness under 
the circumstances." [emphasis added] None of the Memoranda filed by the Defendant in 
Judge Frank G. Noel's Court pertaining either to the Defendants' own Motion for Summary 
Judgment, or in opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, discuss 
any cases dealing with the factual circumstances in COUNT 5 of the underlying Complaint. 
Furthennore, Defendant's counsel failed, refused, and neglected to acknowledge the holding 
of this Court of Appeals in Drysdale v. Rogers, supra, and did not even cite that case or 
discuss it even though the case adopted § 316 of the Restatement of Torts (Second) holding 
that a parent is liable for failing to properly supervise and control the conduct of their 
minor child.51 
Rule provides the signature of an attorney or a party "constitutes a certification by him that he has 
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed 
after reasonable inquiry it is well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper 
purposes, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." The 
Rule further provides that a breach of that certification entitles the other party to reasonable expenses 
incurred "because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 
XA11 of the Defendants' Memoranda dealing with this issue are cited in Footnote 41 above. Defendant's 
counsel, Jill Aggeler, admitted to Judge Noel at the May 24,1995 hearing on the parties' motions for Summary 
Judgment she did not cite in her memoranda nor did she then have for Judge Noel any cases holding the three 
exclusions in the homeowners' policy applied to the facts and claims in COUNTS of the underlying complaint. 
Since none of the Defendant's cases discuss the cause of action in Count 5 of the underlying Complaint, it is 
clear the Defendant has not met the "objective19 standard of reasonableness under the circumstances according 
to the cases cited by the author in the annotation at 95 AX.R* 107 in § 6 [a]. Clearly, if the Defendant 
cannot cite any cases substantiating its refusal to defend the Olsons with respect to the allegations in Count 
5 of the underlying Complaint, the Defendant should never have filed its "Answer" with respect to the 
Plaintiffs' Complaint wherein Defendant stated it had a valid defense. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed in the foregoing ten (10) Points in this Brief, the Plaintiffs 
submit there was a sufficient basis for Judge Frank G. Noel to grant the "Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Insurance Policy Liability" dated January 23,1995, 
and this Court should, accordingly, affirm the action taken by Judge Noel and remand this 
case for trial of the remaining bad-faith issues. 
DATED this 8th day of March 1996. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES A. McESfTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C 
JAMES A. McINTOSH 
Attorney for Appellees 
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